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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite its institutional sprawl and legal complexity, the modern 
administrative state is commonly understood to reflect a single, central 
balancing act.  On the one hand, agencies are granted vast policymaking 
discretion in deference to their superior subject matter expertise.  On the 
other hand, that delegation is simultaneously cabined by a thicket of 
procedural constraints, intended to serve as safeguards against arbitrary or 
opportunistic decision-making.1  The end product is regulation that 
emerges from a “very elaborate, inclusive, deliberate, multi[-]staged, 
heavily lawyered decision[-]making process.”2  Rather than rehash the 
merits of this standard model, public law scholarship increasingly seeks to 
uncover pockets of administrative “unorthodoxy,” where the typical 
checks on agency action fall away.3   A classic example concerns executive 
inaction, where the President’s judgment to not enforce the law cannot be 
second-guessed by other political actors.4  Another paradigm case involves 
regulation during periods of emergency, which tend to empower agencies 
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to seize the policy agenda in a relatively unfettered manner.5  The recent 
financial crisis proved fertile ground for emergency regulation and, 
according to one influential account, freed agencies to adopt highly 
informal crisis management tactics that amounted to a regime of 
“regulation by deal.”6 
While emergency interventions such as regulation by deal are by 
definition temporary, this article identifies a new form of administrative 
unorthodoxy—“regulation by settlement”—that is reshaping the day-to-
day status quo of financial regulation and may be here to stay.  Regulation 
by settlement refers to a practice that has emerged from recent changes in 
the regulatory enforcement environment, which include an increased 
emphasis on corporate (rather than individual) liability, skyrocketing 
monetary penalties, and the nearly exclusive imposition of those penalties 
via innovative legal instruments that facilitate out-of-court settlement.  
Regulation by settlement has two defining features.  First, although 
regulatory settlements are nominally packaged in the form of 
particularized adversarial disputes, agencies now leverage those 
agreements in a manner that effectively establishes new legal standards of 
general applicability.  They are a tool for setting policy.  Second, the 
procedural posture of those settlements allows agencies to engage in a 
uniquely freewheeling mode of regulation, which sidesteps nearly all of 
the legal constraints that are familiar to the standard administrative model. 
To make these conceptual points more concrete, this article presents 
three case studies that illustrate how regulation by settlement operates in 
practice.7  In each case, the basic pattern is a series of settlements that are 
negotiated in rapid succession, involve fines reaching into the billions of 
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dollars, and target certain areas of the financial system on a comprehensive 
basis.  Imposing penalties on such a scale carries a precedential effect that 
allows agencies to establish general rules-of-the-road going forward.8  
Importantly, those rules redefine the contours of substantive policy 
because the settlements at issue do not closely track pre-established legal 
obligations.  Instead, they tend to be premised on novel theories of liability 
that involve aggressive statutory interpretation or otherwise draw on 
background legal materials in a creative fashion.9  In the process, federal 
agencies have wielded regulatory settlements in a way that reshapes the 
governance of the financial system to a degree that goes far beyond 
traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion. 
The informality of regulation by settlement enables agencies to dictate 
policy unencumbered from the legal constraints that apply to notice-and-
comment rulemaking, which is the “dominant procedural vehicle for 
agency lawmaking.”10  When engaging in rulemaking, agencies must 
follow protocols set out by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
which subject their policy judgments to extensive public scrutiny before 
being finalized.11  In stark contrast, the negotiation of agency settlements 
is a confidential affair, concluded with a handshake in Washington 
conference rooms.12  Regulatory settlements are also immune from most 
forms of centralized executive branch review, including cost-benefit 
analysis requirements and other rigors that have become synonymous with 
“Presidential Administration.”13  Finally, once promulgated, 
                                                          
 8.   Of course, the “regulation” that results is implicit and does not have the force of law in any 
traditional or technical sense.  But that is of limited real-world significance to the market actors that 
act in its shadow, who as a practical matter must adopt the realist position that “the law is what 
regulators will do.”  Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460–
61 (1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what 
I mean by the law.”). 
 9.   Regulation by settlement is therefore distinct from related analyses that focus on the 
influence that remedial terms in DOJ settlement agreements have on corporate compliance procedures.  
See generally Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through 
Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2017); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions 
and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007). 
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437, 444 (2003).  The prominent role of notice-and-comment rulemaking is especially evident in 
financial regulation, where it is a cornerstone of the Dodd Frank Act.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 11.   See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) [hereinafter 
APA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.). 
 12.   Stewart, supra note 1, at 1687 (observing that “the quiet settlement of litigation once 
initiated . . . take[s] place through informal procedures where the traditional controls have not normally 
applied”). 
 13.   See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001); 
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administrative rules may be scrutinized pursuant to the “hard look” 
standard applied by federal courts.  The bargains struck in regulatory 
settlements, meanwhile, are memorialized with out-of-court legal 
instruments that are susceptible to little or no judicial review. 
Here, administrative law specialists will interject with the Chenery 
principle, which holds that agencies have discretion to conduct 
policymaking through any procedural vehicle available, including 
adjudicative hearings and informal statements such as guidance 
documents.14  Securities law experts will likewise point to the SEC’s 
alleged use of “regulation by enforcement” to develop insider trading 
law.15  The most striking quality of regulation by settlement, however, is 
that it allows agencies to avert two pervasive tradeoffs that accompany the 
decision to switch from notice-and-comment rulemaking to take 
advantage of less formal policymaking venues.  The first is a “formality-
review” tradeoff, in which agencies tend to receive more deferential 
judicial review in exchange for adopting more formal procedures.16  
Agencies face a “substance-discretion” tradeoff as well.  In general, 
regulators must invest in greater procedural formality when making 
decisions that push the substantive boundaries of policy in bolder 
directions.17  Yet unlike most other informal modes of agency action, 
regulation by settlement simultaneously circumvents both tradeoffs, by 
combining aggressive substantive policymaking with maximal procedural 
laxness and minimal ex post review. 
Although the primary purpose of this article is to present a positive 
analysis of regulation by settlement, it closes by considering normative 
issues as well as potential policy reforms.  The rise of regulatory 
settlements has been viewed as in tension with traditional rule of law 
values.  As this article will argue, however, many of these concerns are 
misplaced.18  From a less legalistic and more consequentialist perspective, 
it is clear that regulation by settlement carries costs as well as benefits.  Its 
primary benefit is to invest agencies with greater flexibility, by allowing 
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 14.   See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208–09 (1947) (Chenery II).  
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regulators to police corporate misconduct in a way that keeps pace with 
evolving market conditions and the strategic adaptations of firms.  At the 
same time, reliance on settlements necessarily injects ambiguity into the 
legal standards that govern market activity, and may also encourage 
agencies to intervene in regulated industries in an uncoordinated or 
otherwise overly aggressive manner.  As the case studies show, the weight 
of these costs and benefits does not uniformly cut in one direction, and 
depends on the legal and economic context in which regulation by 
settlement is applied.  A policy upshot is that any reform to agencies’ 
enforcement practices should be incremental and work at the margin.  
While the main proposals in this area advocate for enhanced judicial 
scrutiny of regulatory settlements, this article explains that a more 
promising approach would be to facilitate greater oversight of settlements 
within the executive hierarchy itself.19 
The broader contribution of this article is to supply a richer account of 
the regulatory process by examining its public law and business law 
aspects in parallel.  Although administrative law and financial regulation 
overlap along prominent historical and institutional dimensions, legal 
scholarship has displayed a puzzling tendency to consider each in 
isolation.20  Thus, as one commentator has observed, the time is “ripe for 
sustained and reciprocal engagement between administrative law and 
financial regulation at both a conceptual and more granular level.”21  This 
article takes up both challenges.  It first proceeds by adopting a fine-
grained look at the evolving procedural features of agency enforcement 
practices, and explains the overlooked ways they have come to influence 
the substance of financial regulation.  It then uses those same 
developments in financial regulation as a lens to uncover a new and 
qualitatively distinct mode of regulatory policymaking, thereby advancing 
the administrative law literature on agency unorthodoxy. 
The organization of this article is as follows.  Section II approaches 
regulation by settlement from a business law perspective that analyzes its 
growing role in the governance of the financial system.  Section III turns 
to the public law implications of regulation by settlement, and explains 
how it represents a novel mode of unorthodox administrative lawmaking.  
                                                          
 19.   See infra Section IV.B (identifying administrative mechanisms established under the Dodd-
Frank Act that could be made responsible for new oversight procedures).  
 20.   See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Notes from the Border: Writing Across the Administrative 
Law/Financial Regulation Divide, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 64, 64 (2016) (finding it “surprising . . . how 
little has been written across the seemingly thin divide that separates administrative law and financial 
regulation”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The 
Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 3, 2015, at 129, 129.  
 21.   Metzger, supra note 20, at 131. 
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Section IV considers normative issues and then reviews potential policy 
reforms.  Section V briefly concludes. 
II. REGULATION BY SETTLEMENT & THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
This section explains how federal agencies have reshaped the content 
of post-crisis financial regulation by settling enforcement actions against 
firms.  Section A identifies key changes in the regulatory landscape that 
were preconditions for that process to emerge.  Section B presents three 
case studies that illustrate how settlements are used to set policy in 
practice.  Section C briefly notes further examples and provides a 
summary. 
A. The Rise of Regulatory Settlements 
Regulation by settlement has been made possible by a sweeping 
transformation in the enforcement practices of administrative agencies 
responsible for financial regulation and related areas of securities law.  The 
origins of the new enforcement environment can be traced to changes that 
began in the early 2000s and have developed along four, interrelated 
fronts.  First, where enforcement actions against individuals were once the 
standard, actions against firms have become the norm.  Second, disputes 
between agencies and firms are now almost exclusively resolved via 
settlement agreements, rather than adjudication on the merits.  Third, the 
nature of settlements has evolved, due to innovative legal instruments 
which limit judicial review while also facilitating regulator-firm bargains 
that incorporate a broader set of terms.  Fourth, enforcement actions have 
resulted in dramatically higher monetary penalties. 
Regulatory enforcement efforts directed at malfeasance in financial 
markets has traditionally targeted individuals rather than firms.  A 
paradigm case is enforcement of insider trading by the SEC, which began 
in the 1960s and has always overwhelmingly consisted of actions against 
individuals.22  In banking regulation, the 1980s savings-and-loan crisis 
resulted in hundreds of criminal convictions of individuals by the DOJ.23  
Likewise, agencies such as the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
                                                          
 22.   See James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 
100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 150–52 (2012). 
 23.   See Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L 
Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S170 n.105 (1991) (providing statistics on financial executives 
convicted of crimes in connection with S&L era investigations). 
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(CFTC) have tended to use their remedial authority to target market 
professionals with license revocations and modest fines.24 
Corporate liability started to receive greater emphasis with a pair of 
guidance documents—the DOJ’s Holder Memorandum of 1999 and the 
SEC’s Seaboard Report of 2001—both of which provided government 
attorneys with a roadmap for bringing cases specifically against firms.25  
The shift in enforcement priorities gained traction shortly thereafter, when 
the dotcom boom collapsed in a wave of accounting fraud and options 
back-dating scandals.  Although that era yielded hundreds of proceedings 
against corporate managers, high-profile firms such as Enron and 
WorldCom were found liable as well.26  Those successes spurred 
regulators to further prioritize “[v]igorous enforcement . . . [against] 
corporate wrongdoers.”27  A full swing of the enforcement pendulum from 
individual to corporate liability was complete following the financial crisis 
of 2008.  As has been widely documented (and frequently criticized), 
actions against the high-ranking financial executives who were involved 
in those events have been nearly non-existent relative to historical 
standards.28 
                                                          
 24.   See Ben Protess, Libor Case Energizes a Wall Street Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 
2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/libor-case-energizes-gensler-and-the-c-f-t-c/?mcub 
z=0. 
 25.   Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, 
Securities Act Release No. 44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001); Memorandum from Eric 
Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations 
to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2012/12/03/response2-appx-k.pdf. 
 26.   See Peter Lattman, Looking at Ken Lay and the Lack of Financial Crisis Cases, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/looking-at-ken-lay-and-the-lack-of-
financial-crisis-cases/ (reporting that dot-com-era enforcement resulted in “1,300 corporate fraud 
convictions, including cases against more than 200 [high-ranking executives]”); see also Stephen J. 
Choi, Anat Carmy Wiechman & Adam C. Pritchard, Scandal Enforcement at the SEC: The Arc of the 
Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 542 (2013). 
 27.   Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t. of Justice, on 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authche
ckdam.pdf.  
 28.   See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1410–11 (2014) 
(noting the “surprising dearth of individual penalties” coming out of the financial crisis); see also Jed 
S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-
executive-prosecutions/; Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the 
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/14/ 
business/20110414-prosecute.html?mcubz=0 (comparing the response to the savings and loan crisis 
and the recent financial crisis). 
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While settlement of regulatory actions has always been commonplace, 
it became a predetermined outcome following the dotcom-era 
enforcements.  The proximate cause was a jury trial of Enron’s auditor, 
the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, which ended in a criminal 
conviction that immediately drove the company into bankruptcy.  The 
Arthur Andersen episode gave rise to the perception that findings of 
criminal liability amounted to a “corporate death penalty,” due to the 
costly collateral consequences that firms could expect to encounter as a 
result.29  Risk-averse firms reacted by becoming even more avoidant of 
bet-the-company litigation, regardless of the underlying merits.30  The 
government also expressed unease with the Arthur Andersen episodes and 
acknowledged the unfairness that corporate penalties carried for otherwise 
innocent shareholders and employees.31  Thus, the demand for settlement 
increased for all parties involved. 
Supply rose to meet demand once the DOJ began to offer firms the 
option of resolving enforcement actions pursuant to previously esoteric 
legal instruments—known as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) 
and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) (collectively, pretrial diversion 
agreements (PDAs)).32  Those agreements had innovative features that 
made settlement even more attractive for both sides.  Firms benefited from 
PDAs because they allow defendants to not only escape trial, but also 
avoid the collateral consequences associated with admissions of 
wrongdoing, which are by definition required in traditional guilty pleas.33  
                                                          
 29.   Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate 
Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 800 (2013). Collateral 
consequences include reputational harm in the marketplace, bans on eligibility for government 
contracting, and follow-on shareholder class actions.  See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 6–7, 20–25. 
 30.   Cunningham, supra note 9, at 14.  Arthur Andersen was ruined despite ultimately prevailing 
on the merits.  Four years after the firm’s bankruptcy, a 9-0 Supreme Court decision vacated its 
conviction on all counts.  Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 696–97 (2005); See 
also Markoff, supra note 29, 804–05 (describing the demise of Arthur Andersen).  
 31.   See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 27 (stating this concern); see also Lanny 
A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Speech at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012)  
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-
bar-association (“In reaching every charging decision, we must take into account the effect of an 
indictment on innocent employees and shareholders, just as we must take into account the nature of 
the crimes committed and the pervasiveness of the misconduct.”). 
 32.   Garrett, supra note 9, at 887–900 (describing the DOJ development and increase in use of 
PDAs).  With a DPA, a prosecutor files a criminal charge (or criminal information) in court but agrees 
to defer any actual prosecution if the defendant satisfies certain terms and conditions.  Under an NPA, 
a prosecutor agrees not to file a charging document at all in return for a firm’s commitment to certain 
conditions.  NPAs are therefore memorialized in the form of a letter, rather than a court document.  
Garrett, supra note 9, at 938 (appendix detailing the main features of DPAs and NPAs).   
 33.   See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys 18–
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Because they are subject to little or no judicial review, PDAs provided the 
government with a valuable new low-risk, low-cost dispute resolution 
vehicle.34  The DOJ also took advantage of the informal, out-of-court 
nature of PDAs to introduce novel settlement terms—which require firms 
to reform internal compliance procedures and to install corporate 
“monitors” who are authorized to supervise the performance of those 
initiatives—that made detection and punishment of recidivism a foregone 
conclusion.35  Lastly, for the very reason that firms preferred PDAs to 
guilty pleas, they gave the government leverage to extract larger 
penalties.36 
The DOJ almost never offered pretrial diversion agreements prior to 
2003, but their use has since exploded, and PDAs now represent the DOJ’s 
primary legal mechanism for concluding actions against high-profile 
corporate defendants.37  The novel legal format of settlement agreements 
has not been limited to criminal enforcement.  During the same post-2003 
period, the SEC has adapted its use of civil settlement instruments, such 
as cease-and-desist orders, to mimic the out-of-court posture, enhanced 
monetary penalties, and broad remedial terms of PDAs.38  After the 
                                                          
20 (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-
08282008.pdf (providing a relatively unconditional embrace of reliance on PDAs). 
 34.   See infra notes 204–14 and accompanying text (reviewing the case law on judicial review 
of PDAs). 
 35.   See Cunningham, supra note 9, at 10–15. 
 36.   See id. at 15–20. 
 37.   Before 2003, the DOJ had entered into fewer than 30 DPAs.  Since then, however, it has 
concluded over 300.  The use of NPAs has followed a parallel trajectory.  See Cunningham, supra 
note 9, at 14; Client Alert: 2015 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 
and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 5, 2016), 
[hereinafter Gibson Dunn Client Alert], http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2015-
Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-
Agreements.pdf; see also Brandon L. Garrett & David Zaring, For a Better Way to Prosecute 
Corporations, Look Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013, 3:43 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/for-a-better-way-to-prosecute-corporations-look-
overseas/?mcubz=0 (noting over 60% of DPAs are with public corporations and almost 33% involve 
Fortune 500 or Global 500 companies). 
 38.   Like DPAs, the SEC files civil settlements in federal court on the same day that it enters a 
complaint, and thereby preempts litigation on the merits.  Since 2010, the SEC has begun to follow 
the DOJ by employing DPAs and NPAs itself.  Press Release, Robert Khuzami, Director, SEC, SEC 
Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in 
Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm.  The SEC has also 
made an end-run around its relatively modest civil fining authority, by relying on equitable remedies, 
such as disgorgement, which can exceed standard monetary penalties by multiple orders of magnitude.  
See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and 
Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 399 (2008) (arguing 
that the SEC has shifted to a “punitive” enforcement model during its current “[e]ra of [i]ncreasing 
[p]enalties against [s]hareholders”). 
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financial crisis, the same basic settlement procedures have been adopted 
with equal vigor by the full gamut of federal financial agencies.39 
The new breed of corporate settlements has been associated with 
dollar penalties that would have been unfathomable in previous 
enforcement eras.  Over the first dozen years of their existence, PDAs have 
been associated with total monetary penalties of over $40 billion.40  
Corporate penalties imposed by the DOJ—the majority of which are now 
paid by financial institutions—rose steadily for ten consecutive years, 
culminating with more than $22 billion paid from 2001 to 2015 by 
financial institutions.41  A $550 million settlement between the SEC and 
Goldman Sachs in 2010 was hailed at the time as the “largest-ever penalty 
paid by a Wall Street firm.”42  But within two years, that record was beaten 
by a factor of thirty when Bank of America entered into a multi-agency 
settlements for $16.6 billion.43  These trends are not attributable to a few 
outlier agencies.  Financial regulators that have a prior track record of 
extracting significant corporate fines—such as the Federal Reserve Board, 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) or CFTC—now regularly 
impose penalties that reach into the billions per year.44 
                                                          
 39.   See John F. Savarese & Wayne M. Carlin, White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement Trends 
in 2014, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 28, 2014), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/28/white-collar-and-regulatory-enforcement-trends-in-
2014/ (“Other government regulators also continue to be active in the civil enforcement areas.  In 
addition to the SEC, which has long made aggressive use of its civil enforcement power, other agencies 
such as the CFTC, the newly-formed CFPB and bank regulators, such as the OCC and the Federal 
Reserve, have become much more aggressive in seeking civil enforcement remedies and penalties.”). 
 40.   See Gibson Dunn Client Alert, supra note 37. 
 41.   Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33, 36 (2016), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-rise-of-bank-prosecutions.  Specifically, the amount paid 
by financial institutions increased from zero in 2001 to almost seven billion in 2015.  See id.  
 42.   Goldman, Sachs & Co., Litigation Release No. 21592, 98 SEC Docket 3135, 2010 WL 
2799362 (July 15, 2010).  Compare a 2002 settlement with Xerox, in which “the SEC obtained its first 
$10 million [enforcement] penalty” against a securities issuer.  Atkins & Bondi, supra note 38. 
 43.   All told, regulatory enforcement actions against banks for securitization practices has been 
estimated to have resulted in $110 billion in penalties.  Christina Rexrod & Emily Glazer, Big Banks 
Paid $110 Billion in Mortgage-Related Fines. Where Did the Money Go?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-paid-110-billionin-mortgage-related-fines-where-did-the-
money-go-1457557442. 
 44.   In 2014 alone, enforcement actions by the CFTC reportedly resulted in $3.14 billion in civil 
penalties.  Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Releases Annual 
Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2015 (Nov. 6, 2015), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7274-15 [hereinafter CFTC Annual Enforcement 
Results, Fiscal Year 2015].  Although some commentators argue that agencies are inflating these 
figures, no amount of rounding up alters the picture of a massive rise in the severity of penalties over 
recent years.  See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016) (describing flaws in the SEC’s reported 
statistics). 
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Each of the developments summarized above have been noted in the 
business law literature, but typically in a piecemeal fashion that focuses 
on particular agencies, settlement instruments, or legal prohibitions.  Such 
an approach obscures the striking fact that all four trends have taken place 
on a roughly contemporaneous basis, across every agency with jurisdiction 
over financial institutions, and in the context of both criminal and civil 
corporate liability.  To a large extent, regulators at the OCC now wield 
settlement instruments such as consent orders in a manner that is 
functionally indistinguishable from the use of DPAs by DOJ prosecutors.45  
An implication is that there has been a reorientation of the relationship 
between the financial system and the administrative state as a whole, with 
regulatory settlements now occupying a central role.  As a result, agencies 
are able to leverage those agreements in a manner that reshapes policy to 
a degree that goes far beyond traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion 
or “regulation by enforcement.”46 
B. Three Case Studies 
The following three case studies illustrate how regulation by 
settlement works in practice.  The first case involves enforcement of anti-
corruption prohibitions in securities law pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA).  Although the FCPA Settlements do not concern 
“financial regulation” narrowly understood, they are an important 
precursor and blueprint for agency practices that have subsequently been 
applied more broadly in financial regulation.  The second case study looks 
at settlements arising from agency actions against the issuance of 
mortgage-backed securities by large banks that were at the heart of the 
financial crisis (the Securitization Settlements).  The Securitization 
Settlements reveal that a major component of post-financial crisis 
regulation has been dictated informally through settlements, rather than 
the regime installed under the Dodd-Frank Act.  The third case examines 
                                                          
 45.   See infra Section II.B.ii (analyzing the parallel application of those agreements to the same 
underlying conduct).  Legal scholarship has at times sketched a rough analogy between criminal 
prosecution and administrative enforcement, but as the case studies below will show, regulation by 
settlement goes much further and completely collapses any meaningful distinction between “white 
collar crime” and regulatory enforcement.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (drawing on 
the administrative law-prosecution analogy); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal 
Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing 
Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 3, 1997, at 23, 23 (drawing on the 
administrative law-prosecution analogy). 
 46.   See infra Section III.B.iii (comparing regulation by settlement to previous forms of 
administrative enforcement). 
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a line of settlements in connection with financial benchmarks such as the 
Libor index (the Benchmark Settlements).  The Benchmark Settlements 
provide a case in which regulation by settlement has been applied to 
critical areas of the financial sector which were not directly related to the 
financial crisis. 
1. The FCPA Settlements 
Congress passed the FCPA in 1977,47 in response to a series of 
corporate corruption scandals that were uncovered during the Watergate 
investigation.48  The core of the statute is its “anti-bribery provisions,” 
which prohibit entities or individuals from making improper payments to 
foreign governments in order to gain a business advantage.49  In addition, 
the FCPA has “books-and-records” and “internal controls” provisions, 
which require that corporate accounting procedures are reasonably 
designed to detect or deter potentially illicit payments.50  The law is jointly 
enforced by the DOJ and SEC.51 
The FCPA’s enforcement history is a microcosm of the system-wide 
enforcement trends reviewed above.  From the date of its passage until the 
early 2000s, the statute was a legal curio that was rarely used.52  Since that 
initial quiet period, however, enforcement efforts at both the DOJ and SEC 
have rapidly accelerated.53  The rise of FCPA enforcement has paralleled 
the broader shift in focus from individual to corporate liability.  It also 
tracks the turn toward settlement as the exclusive mode of dispute 
resolution, including the abandonment of traditional guilty pleas in favor 
of pretrial diversion agreements.54  Lastly, the relatively modest fines 
                                                          
 47.   Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–3, 78ff, 78m (2012). 
 48.  SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND 
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2 (1976). 
 49.   15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 50.   Id. at § 78m(b).  
 51.   The DOJ has authority to pursue criminal penalties, while the SEC can impose fines and 
disgorgement of profits in connection with civil liability.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 
16, 2015) [hereinafter FCPA Guidance], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf. 
 52.   The DOJ only prosecuted 25 FCPA actions against corporations for the entire 1977–1998 
period.  See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—1977 to 2010, 
12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 103 (2010). 
 53.   See id. at 104–05 (describing the increase in FCPA actions “the current post-Enron, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) era”). 
 54.   See Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 497, 497–98 
(2015) [hereinafter Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement].   
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which characterized the FCPA’s quiet period have given way to a boom-
era of skyrocketing penalties that now reach into the billions per year.55 
What is the legal basis underlying the sudden surge in corporate FCPA 
liability?  A precise answer is surprisingly difficult to pin down by 
reference to the standard legal sources.  Congress expressed core elements 
of the law with vague language that cries out for further clarification: a 
bribe consists of an offer to “corruptly” provide “anything of value” to a 
“foreign official” in order to “obtain[] or retain[] business.”56  There is an 
available legislative history, but it has been subject to neglect, and reflects 
a Nixonian, Cold War milieu that is of uncertain applicability to the 
contemporary global business environment.57  Case law is of limited help 
as well.  Because the FCPA enforcement boom has been concurrent with 
the rise of regulatory settlements, federal courts have had minimal 
opportunities to flesh out the meaning of important yet ambiguous 
statutory terms.58  In fact, only one corporate defendant has ever taken 
FCPA-related charges to trial, and that was a 1983 case from the FCPA’s 
pre-modern era.59  The enforcement agencies, for their part, have done 
little to fill the resulting interpretive void.  There is an FCPA “Opinion 
Procedure,” established by statutory amendments in 1988, but it only 
allows the agencies to respond to hypothetical scenarios that are 
volunteered by firms, and is rarely utilized.60  And, with the exception of 
a guidance document issued in 2012 (to be discussed below), the only 
other agency interpretative materials that have been released are a pair of 
rules issued by the SEC in 1979.61 
                                                          
 55.   The DOJ has collected roughly $3 billion since 2010.  See id. at 522 n.63. 
 56.   15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012).  See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest 
Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1239 
(2007) (“Vagueness and ambiguity are the DNA of the FCPA . . . .”). 
 57.   See generally Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. 
L.J.  929 (2012). 
 58.   United States v. Kozeny, 493 F. Supp. 2d 693, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that there are 
“surprisingly few decisions throughout the country on the FCPA”). 
 59.   SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983).  Since 2004, only 
two of the DOJ’s FCPA actions have even progressed to criminal indictments, and both of those were 
dismissed: Lindsey Manufacturing Co. and Cinergy Telecomm’ns Inc. See United States v. Aguilar, 
831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“throw[ing] out the convictions of Defendants Lindsey 
Manufacturing Company, Keith  E. Lindsey and Steve K. Lee and dismiss[ing] the First Superseding 
Indictment”); Case Information, STAN. L. SCH. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACS. ACT CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcement-action.html?id=264 (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (charges against 
Cinergy Telecommunications, Inc. dismissed on February 24, 2012). 
 60.   See Matthew W. Muma, Toward Greater Guidance: Reforming the Definitions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1344 (2014) (“Unfortunately, [Opinion 
Releases] are scarce, slow in coming, and highly general”). 
 61.   17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13b2-1 to -2. 
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Accordingly, when corporate counsel prepare to advise their clients on 
FCPA liability, they do not linger over the statute, regulatory materials, or 
judicial opinions.  Instead, they consult online databases that summarize 
prior settlements, and attempt to extract a general rule that will predict 
future enforcement practices.62  Because FCPA settlements have 
repeatedly centered around particular industries, business practices, or 
statutory terms, certain implicit legal standards governing anti-corruption 
law have in fact emerged.63  Notably, the dominant pattern is for those 
standards to take the pre-existing legal materials in broad and creative 
directions. 
One example is the FCPA’s requirement that it must be a “foreign 
official” who receives the bribe in order for liability to be triggered under 
the Act.64  One possibility—consistent with the circumstances surrounding 
the FCPA’s passage, as well the first two decades of its enforcement—is 
that such a category is limited to high-ranking government 
representatives.65  But a string of boom-era settlements has established a 
much more capacious definition.  Pursuant to those precedents, the 
“foreign official” label applies not only to low-ranking bureaucrats, but 
also covers employees of private companies, such as medical personnel at 
hospitals, in which the government has a partial (in some case only 
minority) ownership stake.66  Because a good deal of investment takes 
place in developing economies where the line between private and public 
                                                          
 62.   See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (July 5, 2017), 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2017/07/Shearman--Sterlings-
Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-the-Enforcement-of-t.pdf. 
 63.   Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 22 (2011) (statement of Michael 
Mukasey) (“The primary statutory interpretive function therefore is performed almost exclusively by 
the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC, which are responsible for bringing FCPA charges.  By negotiating 
resolutions in many cases before an indictment or enforcement action is filed . . . [w]e are left with a 
circumstance in which . . . ‘the FCPA means what the enforcement agencies say it means.’”).   
 64.   15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f) (2012).  The statute further provides that a “foreign official” may 
consist of a government “department,” “agency,” or “instrumentality.”  Id. 
 65.   See From SOE Employees to Health Care Providers – The “Foreign Officials” of 2012, 
FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Jan. 10, 2013), http://fcpaprofessor.com/from-soe-employees-to-health-
care-providers-the-foreign-officials-of-2012/. 
 66.   See Roger M. Witten et al., Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical 
and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 697 (2009).  For example, Alcatel Lucent SA was 
charged for paying a Malaysian telecomm entity, Telekom Malaysia Berhad, which had a 43% public 
ownership stake and was considered a government entity for the purposes of the FCPA.  Joseph W. 
Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 822, 822 n.195–97 
(2011). 
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sectors is often far from clear, the agencies’ “foreign official” 
interpretation has proven highly consequential.67 
Another policy question concerns the relevant benefit that a 
corporation must receive in exchange for its payment to a foreign official. 
The statutory language requires that a bribe be intended to “obtain and 
retain business,” which, under some readings, might be limited to 
payments used to rig the bidding in auctions for government procurement 
contracts.68  In contrast, a number of settlements are premised on a broader 
interpretation that reaches regulatory preferences of all kinds, such as 
decisions regarding tax treatments or licensing approvals.69  Despite the 
settlements’ liberal interpretation of what it means to “obtain and retain 
business,” that definition is potentially cabined by a related statutory safe 
harbor, known as the “facilitating payments” exception.  The facilitating 
payments exception provides that, regardless of the nature of the benefit 
received, there is no liability in cases where the foreign official was 
obligated by law to provide the benefit but withheld it in order to extort 
further corporate payments.70  In practice, however, that exception has 
been whittled away to the point of being regarded as “illusory.”71  Thus, 
in insurance law parlance, regulatory settlements have expanded the 
FCPA’s coverage provisions and narrowed its exclusion provisions: the 
standard which results is that liability can be triggered when a corporation 
receives a wide range of favorable decisions from a foreign official, 
whether or not the benefits involved were legally owed to the company in 
the first place. 
A few more significant examples can be noted briefly.  The FCPA 
includes a knowledge requirement for violations of the book-and-records 
and internal controls provisions: after multiple settlements that turn on 
those violations, however, the scienter element has seemingly been 
                                                          
 67.   A rare interpretation of the foreign official provision was recently provided by the Eleventh 
Circuit, but that opinion applied a vague “totality of the circumstances” style test, and appears to have 
only sown further confusion in this area.  United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 920–24 (11th Cir. 
2014), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Regulatory Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 
123 Stat. 1617 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9)), as recognized in United States v. Gross, 661 F. 
App’x 1007, 1022–23 (11th Cir. 2016); see generally Amy Lynn Soto, United States v. Esquenazi: 
Injecting Clarity or Confusion into the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 U. MIAMI. INTER-AM. L. 
REV. 383 (2016). 
 68.   See MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 90–98 (Edward 
Elgar Publ’g Ltd., 2014).  
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001–03, 102 
Stat. 1107, 1415–25 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988)). 
 71.   See generally Richard Grime & Sara Zdeb, The Illusory Facilitating Payments Exception: 
Risks Posed by Ongoing FCPA Enforcement Actions and the U.K. Bribery Act, in THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2011 377, 382–89 (Richard Grime et al. ed., 2011). 
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refashioned into a strict liability standard.72  The agencies’ jurisdiction 
over foreign corporations, which is limited by a condition that bribes must 
be associated with actions that share a territorial nexus with the United 
States, has been extended by settlements that find such a connection  based 
on little or no actual contact, and therefore grant the statute an essentially 
global reach.73  Settlements have also taken statutory language which 
declares that “anything of value” may constitute a bribe quite literally, and 
have signaled that the definition can be satisfied not only by cash 
payments, but also with a wide variety of non-monetary goods (t-shirts; 
executive training programs) and indirect benefits (charitable donations; 
internships for relatives).74 
The track record of FCPA enforcement against individuals reinforces 
the intuition that the statutory interpretations and theories of liability 
implicit in the corporate settlements are neither conservative nor obvious.  
Corporate liability logically entails individual culpability in most 
instances, yet the DOJ and SEC have largely hesitated to bring parallel 
actions against individuals.75  When they do—presumably in the subset of 
cases which are strongest on the merits—they frequently fail.76  Moreover, 
the government’s setbacks in court tend to involve the interpretation of 
                                                          
 72.   15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5).  See, e.g., Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., Litigation Release No. 
21161, 2009 WL 2356796 (July 31, 2009); Avery Dennison Corp., Litigation Release No. 21156, 2009 
WL 2243830 (July 28, 2009); Dow Chemical Co., Litigation Release No. 20000, 2007 WL 460874 
(Feb. 13, 2007); see Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 976–
81 (2010). 
 73.   As established by the 1998 Amendments, foreign corporations may be subject to FCPA 
liability if they either issue securities on U.S exchanges, or if they have contact with U.S. territory “in 
furtherance of” conduct prohibited by the statute.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 
78dd-3; see Daniel Patrick Ashe, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 
2902–03, 2917–18 (2005). 
 74.   JP Morgan Chase & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 79335, 2016 WL 6804113 (Nov. 17, 
2016) (involving internships for relatives); UTStarcom, Inc., Litigation Release No. 21357, 2009 WL 
5171952 (Dec. 31, 2009) (concerning payment of training programs); Titan Corp., Litigation Release 
No. 19107, 2005 WL 474238 (Mar. 1, 2005) (involving campaign t-shirts); Schering-Plough Corp., 
Litigation Release No. 18740, 2004 WL 1268036 (June 9, 2004) (concerning donations to a Polish 
hospital).   
 75.   During the 17-year “quiet period” of FCPA enforcement, 20 of 24 DOJ actions against 
companies also included charges against individuals; in the boom era, less than a quarter, 20 of 84, 
have done the same.  See Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, supra note 54, at 531–
41.  The SEC also does not pursue individual charges, which have accompanied only 17% of the 
agency’s corporate actions since 2008.  See A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR 
BLOG (Jan. 27, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-actions-3/. 
 76.   See Paul Barrett, Plea Deals Are Easy, Juries Are Hard, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 
23, 2015, 3:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-23/u-s-prosecutors-keep-
losing-trials-in-overseas-corruption-cases. 
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key provisions that were reviewed above.77  It is revealing that in several 
cases rejecting the government’s legal theories, the court has specifically 
admonished prosecutors for citing prior enforcement actions as legal 
authority.78  This suggests that the agencies themselves have internalized 
the regulation by settlement concept. 
In 2012, the DOJ and SEC jointly released a guidance document, titled 
“A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (the FCPA 
Guidance),79 partially in response to growing demands that the agencies 
produce a more explicit articulation of their theory of the law.  But the 
document was widely panned for adding little new clarity to the agencies’ 
understanding of what the FCPA means.80  Rather than laying out policy 
positions or enforcement philosophies in unambiguous terms that would 
provide direction to regulated parties, the FCPA Guidance mostly consists 
of hypothetical examples that are supported by citations to prior 
settlements.81  An ironic result was that it functioned to reaffirm the 
                                                          
 77.   See, e.g., SEC v. Sharef, 924 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (acquitting, 
dismissing with prejudice, and rejecting the government’s jurisdictional theory); SEC v. Jackson, 908 
F. Supp. 2d 834, 855 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding that the SEC had failed to meet the preponderance of 
evidence burden of proof in a “‘facilitating’ payments” case against an individual, where it had 
previously agreed to $260 million in corporate settlements on the same legal theory); Order Dismissing 
with Prejudice, United States v. Goncalves, No. 09-cr-00335 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012) (dismissing case 
and rejecting government’s “foreign official” theory); Final Dismissal, United States v. O’Shea, No. 
09-cr-00629 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012) (rejecting the government’s “facilitating payments” theory); 
Mem. Op. and Order at 9, SEC v. Mattson, No. H-01-3106 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002) (rejecting 
government’s interpretation of “obtain or retain business.”); Motion for Acquittal, United States v. 
Pou, No. 89-00802 (S.D. Fla. April 17, 1990) (arguing for the court to reject the government’s 
interpretation of “obtain or retain business”); Judgment for Acquittal, United States v. Duran, No. 89-
00802 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 1990) (granting Duran’s Motion for Acquittal);. 
 78.   United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The 
Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.”); 
United States v. Giffen, 326 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that prior record of 
settlements “is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider”).  
 79.   FCPA Guidance, supra note 51. 
 80.   See Muma, supra note 60, at 1344 (“Th[e] [FCPA Guidance] does not expand greatly on 
what practitioners in the field already know, however, and it does not substantially clarify the 
underlying uncertainty in the FCPA’s definitions.”); Wayne M. Carlin, White Collar and Regulatory 
Enforcement: Emerging Trends, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 30, 
2013) https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/01/30/white-collar-and-regulatory-enforcement-
emerging-trends/ (“[T]he FCPA Resource Guide broke little new legal or policy ground”); Joe 
Palazzolo & Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
14, 2012, 6:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873247351045781188501814 
34228 (quoting a former chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section calling the FCPA Guidance “more of a 
scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for companies who care about playing 
by the rules”). 
 81.   What discernible positions it did stake out had the curious intermediate character: more 
tentative than settlements yet bolder than court cases that rejected those theories.  See Mike Koehler, 
Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. (BNA) 961, 961, 
963–64 (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Koehler, Grading the FCPA Guidance] (“[P]ast FCPA 
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precedential value of FCPA settlements rather than displace them with a 
more traditional policymaking vehicle.  Thus, most of the major policy 
decisions relating to federal anti-corruption law—questions of scienter, 
jurisdiction, what counts as a bribe, who counts as a bribe recipient, what 
counts as a bribed benefit—have been determined by de facto rules 
promulgated through regulatory settlements. 
2. The Securitization Settlements 
A major cause of the recent financial crisis was an interconnection 
between large banks and the housing market that was forged by a multi-
step process of financial engineering known as “securitization.”82  In the 
first step of that process, mortgage originators would pool groups of home 
loans and sell them into trusts held by third-party banks.  The banks would 
then issue certificates from those trusts, which offered investors a fixed 
cash flow derived from payments on the underlying mortgage loans 
(Mortgaged-Backed Securities or MBS).  In a further iteration, the MBS 
themselves were securitized, by being pooled and used to back securities 
known as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs).  The earliest use of 
securitization goes back decades, but markets in MBS and other financial 
instruments that securitization churns out only grew to be a substantial 
component of the banking sector following a boom decade that began in 
the mid-1990s.83 
When the housing market deteriorated over the 2006–07 period, 
homeowners’ rates of default on their mortgages spiked, which in turn led 
to a collapse in the value of MBS, CDOs, and related financial instruments 
that were indirectly linked to home loans.84  Because large financial 
institutions had adopted fragile funding models that were vulnerable to any 
reversals in structured finance markets, a spectacular series of failures 
followed over the course of 2008, culminating in the bankruptcies of 
Lehman Brothers and AIG.85  Once the financial system eventually 
stabilized, regulators shifted from the emergency crisis management 
tactics that characterized “regulation by deal,” and initiated a concerted 
                                                          
enforcement actions, in whole or in part, have seemingly run counter to the statements [in the 
Guidance;] . . . [meanwhile,] what the enforcement agencies say in the Guidance has been rejected, in 
whole or in part, by courts”). 
 82.   See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1283 (2012). 
 83.   See VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND 
THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 469–71 (2010). 
 84.   See id. at 470–71. 
 85.   See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6, at 491–504. 
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series of enforcement actions that targeted the banks’ securitization 
practices leading up to the crisis. 
A first round of settlements was spearheaded by the SEC.  The 
opening volley was an investigation of Goldman Sachs—announced while 
Dodd-Frank was still being hotly debated in Congress—which resulted in 
a $550 million settlement that was made public on July 15, 2010, a week 
before the statute was passed.86  The SEC’s underlying claim was that 
Goldman had misled a pair of European banks that invested in its synthetic 
CDO transaction, known as ABACUS 2007-AC1, by failing to disclose 
that a hedge fund manager named John Paulson played a role in selecting 
the collateral backing the deal while simultaneously betting against it.87  
The ABACUS investigation was only the first of a campaign of 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC against the big banks.  In each 
case, the agency alleged that banks had made misrepresentations to 
investors in connection with the issuance of CDOs or similar structured-
finance securities.  By mid-2014, every one of those actions were resolved 
out-of-court with settlement agreements that imposed eight- or nine-figure 
penalties.88  In total, the SEC collected over $3.76 billion in fines.89 
A second round of settlements took place after the Obama 
administration established the “RMBS Working Group” in 2012, which is 
an executive branch task force with the specific mission of redressing 
wrongdoing associated with the financial crisis.90  While nominally led by 
the DOJ, the RMBS Working Group is a multi-agency body that 
coordinates enforcement efforts among the full alphabet soup of federal 
                                                          
 86.   Goldman, Sachs & Co., Litigation Release No. 21592, 2010 WL 2799362 (July 15, 2010) 
(announcing the settlement); Goldman, Sachs & Co., Litigation Release No. 21489, 2010 WL 1514183 
(Apr. 16, 2010) (announcing that the SEC charged Goldman, Sachs & Co.); The SEC’s Impeccable 
Timing, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704671904575194172722146804. 
 87.   Amended Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 10-CV-3229), 2010 WL 5863739. 
 88.   The SEC reached settlements with Wachovia ($11 million; April 5, 2011), J.P. Morgan 
($154 million; June 21, 2011), Citigroup ($285 million; October 19, 2011), J.P. Morgan ($297 million; 
November 16, 2012), Credit Suisse ($120 million; November 16, 2012), UBS ($50 million; August 6, 
2013), Royal Bank of Scotland ($150 million; November 7, 2013), Merrill Lynch ($132 million; 
December 12, 2013), and Morgan Stanley ($275 million; July 24, 2014).  SEC Enforcement Actions: 
Addressing Misconduct that Led To or Arose from the Financial Crisis, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 
7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml.  
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Speaks at the Announcement 
of the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s New Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Working Group (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-speaks-
announcementof-financial-fraud-enforcement-task-force-s.  The RMBS Working Group is embedded 
in a broader organization, the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which was formed by the 
Obama administration in 2009.  Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009). 
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financial regulators, along with several state attorneys general.91  While 
the SEC followed a transaction-specific approach, with each settlement 
covering allegations in connection with a particular securitization deal, the 
RMBS Working Group undertook broader investigations that focused on 
financial institutions as a whole.  Starting in 2014, those efforts quickly 
yielded a string of blockbuster, multi-billion dollar settlements with the 
big banks, through which the RMBS Working Group has imposed over 
$57 billion in aggregate penalties.92 
In addition to the unprecedented dollar amounts involved, one of the 
most salient features of the Securitization Settlements was their 
comprehensive reach.  The SEC could have aimed its investigative 
resources at the most egregious instances of wrongdoing, which, 
presumably, would be associated with transactions at some institutions 
more than others.  Instead, it pursued a conspicuous strategy of “one fine 
                                                          
 91.   Federal agencies associated with the RMBS Working Group included: the SEC, Federal 
Reserve Board, FDIC, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA).  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 90. 
 92.   J.P. Morgan Chase ($13 billion; February 10, 2014); Citigroup ($7 billion; July 13, 2014); 
Bank of America ($16.6 billion; August 21, 2014); Morgan Stanley ($2.6 billion; February 11, 2016); 
Wells Fargo ($1.2 billion; April 8, 2016); Goldman Sachs ($5 billion; April 11, 2016); Deutsche Bank 
($7.2 billion; December 23, 2016); and Credit Suisse ($5.3 billion; December 23, 2016).  Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 
Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic 
Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-
partners-secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup 
for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages (July 14, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-7-
billion-global-settlement; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion 
in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial 
Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-historic-
justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Morgan 
Stanley Agrees to Pay $2.6 Billion Penalty in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage 
Backed Securities (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/morgan-stanley-agrees-pay-26-
billion-penalty-connection-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Wells Fargo Agrees to Pay $1.2 Billion for Improper Mortgage Lending Practices (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wells-fargo-bank-agrees-pay-12-billion-improper-mortgage-lending-
practices; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion in 
Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/goldman-sachs-agrees-pay-more-5-billion-connection-its-sale-
residential-mortgage-backed; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $7.2 
Billion for Misleading Investors in Its Sale of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-bank-agrees-pay-72-billion-misleading-investors-its-sale-
residential-mortgage-backed; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Agrees to Pay $5.28 
Billion in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-agrees-pay-528-billion-connection-its-sale-residential-
mortgage-backed. 
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per bank.”93  Similarly, the RMBS Working Group has adopted what could 
be considered a “market share” theory of corporate liability.  The 
institutions singled out for settlement were simply the largest banks in the 
country; among those settling banks, the bigger the volume of their 
securitization business, the higher the fine.94  The same philosophy is 
reflected in the individual settlement agreements themselves, which 
follow a standard format.  First there is a Statement of Facts, which recites 
from an unrelated grab-bag of internal bank communications, all of which 
betray an embarrassing disregard for due diligence practices and other 
forms of quality control.95  That random assortment of allegations is then 
accompanied by a blanket assertion of liability for the full population of 
MBS transactions (usually numbering in the hundreds) that the bank 
participated in over a multi-year period during the height of the U.S. 
housing bubble era.96  By targeting the banks’ entire course of business 
and leaving no institution unscathed, the Securitization Settlements sent a 
signal that the standard practices of the industry as a whole had violated 
the regulatory rules of the road. 
Identifying the exact legal basis that underpinned those rules, 
however, is far from straightforward.  The rapid rise of securitization was 
not accompanied by the development of a related regulatory framework, 
and structured finance markets therefore operated within a relative legal 
vacuum as part of the so-called “shadow banking sector.”97  A 
consequence was that regulators improvised an “eclectic” approach to 
                                                          
 93.   See Zaring, supra note 28, at 1412–13 (“The resulting list of FIRREA settlements—
approximately one per large bank, in an interesting parallel to the approximately one securities fraud 
settlement with the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) per bank—looks like real money.”). 
 94.   See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage 
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 
1582 tbl. 1 (2015) (describing the securitization activity of big banks). 
 95.   See, e.g., Annex 1 – Statement of Facts to April 2016 Goldman Sachs Settlement Agreement, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/839901/download (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 96.   See, e.g., Annex 3 to April 2016 Goldman Sachs Settlement Agreement, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/839911/download (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (listing covered 
transactions); see also Floyd Norris, Citigroup’s Settlement, Pro and Con, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/business/what-the-citigroup-settlement-gets-right-and-
wrong.html?mcubz=0 (“But the [DOJ] stops short of identifying which securitizations were affected 
and never bothers to say whether the securitizations with problems performed worse than others.  
There is no indication that officials checked to see whether the loans identified as substandard were 
more likely to default than those the consultants deemed to be proper.  There seems to have been no 
effort to quantify just how much Citigroup’s improper behavior cost investors.”). 
 97.   See Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law Improved 
Transmission Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L. REV. 89, 98, 106–07 (2015); 
Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 15 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, No. 458, 2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640545. 
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enforcement that featured a “diversified portfolio” of legal theories.98  As 
in the FCPA context, however, the agencies’ outside-the-box thinking was 
only minimally embraced by the courts, and “[t]here has not been a single 
conviction of a bailed-out bank, or a single senior executive who ran 
one.”99  Thus, the general picture that arises from the Securitization 
Settlements is an industry-wide imposition of fines that is not conditioned 
on a clear connection between particular acts of wrongdoing nor a widely 
recognized, preexisting legal basis for liability. 
The SEC settlements, for example, were premised on the banks having 
committed federal securities fraud, but that same theory did not gain 
traction in cases that were litigated against individuals.  An important early 
test was a DOJ case that brought criminal securities fraud charges against 
two Bear Stearns hedge fund managers.  When both individuals were 
acquitted on all counts, the DOJ was forced to reassess its financial crisis 
litigation strategy more generally, and subsequently dropped most of its 
other pending investigations.100  Meeting civil standards of proof was not 
noticeably easier.101  An SEC litigation against Citigroup trader Brian 
Stoker led to a jury verdict that rejected the government’s theory of 
liability, even though the allegations in that case concerned the very same 
CDO transaction that was the basis for a $285 million settlement with the 
bank itself.102  The SEC’s most prominent success in a securitization case, 
                                                          
 98.   Zaring, supra note 28, at 1411–12 (“These civil suits have relied on a mix of statutes—that 
is, they did not all turn on violations of the securities laws or on other fraud claims. With various 
agencies in action, and various bases for litigation, the best way to characterize the government’s civil 
enforcement strategy is to think of it as a diversified portfolio. . . . [T]he eclectic approach taken by 
the government [regarding theories of liability] is likely to be the definitive one for the crisis.”). 
 99.   Id. at 1438; see also Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State 
of Financial Crisis Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 167–187 (2015) (discussing the paucity 
of convictions against senior bankers); cf. United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d 650, 653 (2nd Cir. 2016) (reversing a jury verdict of civil fraud against mortgage 
originator Countrywide, on grounds of insufficient evidence). 
 100.   See Jean Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204083204577080792356961440 (reporting on 
DOJ dropping cases that were being prepared against AIG executive Joseph Cassano and Countrywide 
CEO Angelo Mozilo); Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, Two Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/11bear.html?mcubz=0 
(reporting on the acquittal of Bear Sterns Managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin). 
 101.   Zaring, supra note 28, at 1410–11. 
 102.   Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 3, 2012, 5:23 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-
jury-that-ruled-against-it/?mcubz=1.  A nearly identical scenario played out again when the SEC 
dropped its case against another individual, Edward Steffelin, which was based on allegations that 
resulted in a $296 million settlement with J.P. Morgan for the same underlying CDO transaction.  See 
Peter J. Henning, Mixed Results for S.E.C. in Financial Crisis Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012, 3:36 
PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/mixed-results-for-s-e-c-in-financial-crisis-cases/?mc 
ubz=0. 
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a jury verdict against Goldman Sachs’ employee Fabrice Tourre for civil 
securities fraud, is best understood as an idiosyncratic exception that 
proves the rule.103 
Rather than invoke the federal securities laws, the RMBS Working 
Group settlements relied on a creative patchwork of statutes that had 
previously been of limited applicability to banking regulation.104  One of 
these was FIRREA, a law passed in response to the 1980s savings-and-
loan crisis, which imposes civil liability for acts of fraud committed 
against banks with federally-insured deposits.105  FIRREA had never 
before been used against bank entities, only against individuals.106  But the 
statute gained legs in connection with the government’s novel “self-
affecting” theory, which turned on the idea that the defrauded bank and 
settling bank were one and the same.107  Another legal component of the 
RMBS Working Group settlements was the False Claims Act (FCA), a 
Civil War era qui tam statute that prohibits false statements made to 
agencies in connection with government contracts or the receipt of other 
public benefits.108  The FCA was foreign to financial regulation prior to 
2008, but was applied on the theory that the banks had made false 
statements to government housing agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or 
HUD) in the process of certifying mortgages that were used in 
securitizations.109  A third legal authority that was invoked were state “blue 
                                                          
 103.   Tourre was a mid-level financial engineer rather than a decision-making executive, and was 
rendered particularly unsympathetic by emails in which he declared himself the “Fabulous Fab” and 
claimed credit for ushering in a financial apocalypse.  See Aaron Smith & James O’Toole, ‘Fabulous 
Fab’ Held Liable in Goldman Fraud Case, CNN MONEY (Aug. 1, 2013, 6:21 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/01/news/companies/tourre-goldman-verdict/index.html. 
 104.   Nick Timiraos et al., U.S. Steps up Loan Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704083904576335582428039612 (“The Justice 
Department has instructed federal prosecutors to be creative in adapting decades-old laws to take 
action against Wall Street . . . .”).   
 105.   Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 951, 12 U.S.C. § 
1833a (2012) (providing for civil penalties); see Nan S. Ellis, Steven B. Dow & David Safavian, Use 
of FIRREA to Impose Liability in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis: A New Weapon in the 
Arsenal to Prevent Financial Fraud, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 119, 130–33 (2015) (describing FIRREA’s 
civil penalties).   
 106.   Ellis et al., supra note 105, at 135, 135 n.75 (“Although FIRREA was enacted in 1989, it 
was virtually ignored as a vehicle to address financial fraud until the [financial crisis]. . . .  Previously, 
FIRREA had been used primarily against officers and directors of failed financial institutions.”). 
 107.   Id. at 139. 
 108.   31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012) (appearing as amended by Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617); see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 1–3 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.  
 109.   See F. Joseph Warin et al., Financial Institutions in the Crosshairs: The False Claims Act 
and FIRREA, GIBSON DUNN 25–32 (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/Documents/FinancialInstitutionsInCrosshairs-webcast-October2013.pdf. 
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sky laws,” which predate the Great Depression and had been largely 
dormant since.110  During the rise of structured finance markets, it is 
unlikely that any of these statutes or associated theories of liability were 
perceived as the governing legal backdrop for banks’ securitization 
practices. 
Taken at face value, the Securitization Settlements carry a startling 
implication: every major bank, in connection with every securitization 
deal, had simultaneously defrauded investors (under federal and state 
securities laws), the government (the False Claims Act), and themselves 
(FIRREA).  But that vision of omnipresent fraud lacks plausibility, not 
only due to its inherent oddness, but also in light of the paltry success of 
related claims that reached adjudication on the merits.  A more convincing 
interpretation is that the underlying conduct, as economically destructive 
as it proved to be, did not involve fraud in the conventional sense of 
intentional deception.111  Rather, the banks which bought and sold 
securitized assets from one another had formed a circular firing squad of 
collectively misguided risk-taking.112  When a generalized drift toward lax 
risk management met an historic drop in housing prices, the worst case 
scenario materialized.113  Because that chain of events was nonetheless 
subject to a comprehensive sweep of regulatory settlements that imposed 
record-setting fines, a novel regulatory “rule” emerges.  The implicit legal 
standard is that banks can be held liable (on a nearly unlimited dollar basis) 
                                                          
 110.   The most prominent blue sky law is New York’s Martin Act.  N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 353 
(McKinney 2012) (permitting suits against anyone who “has engaged in, is engaged or is about to 
engage in any of the practices or transactions heretofore referred to as and declared to be fraudulent 
practices”); see Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation 
in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 544 n.272 (2003) (reporting that the 
Martin Act was rarely used “except to prosecute local scams” for most of its history).   
 111.   See Hilary J. Allen, The Pathologies of Banking Business as Usual, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 861, 
876 (2015); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 554 (2011); Daniel C. 
Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 267–68 (2014); cf. Mitu Gulati et 
al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 (2004) (describing the tendency for securities fraud 
cases to turn on retrospective judgments where the attribution of intentional wrongdoing is influenced 
by bad economic or business outcomes).  
 112.   Cf. Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 507, 508–09 (2010) (arguing the financial crisis is perhaps better explained not by the 
“narrative of moral failure,” but by the “narrative of cognitive failure,” “in which executives and 
regulators overestimated the risk-mitigating effects of quantitative modeling and financial 
engineering”); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases 
in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 808 
(2010) (“Intellectual hazard . . . is the tendency of behavioral biases to interfere with accurate thought 
and analysis within complex organizations . . . [and] was a cause of the Crisis of 2008.”). 
 113.   See Kling, supra note 112, at 508–509 (discussing the “cognitive failures” that led to the 
financial crisis of 2008); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 112, at 821–825 (discussing the “intellectual 
hazards” demonstrated by banks during the financial crisis). 
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for engaging in negligent or grossly negligent business practices when 
participating in securitization markets. 
A complicating factor is that the Securitization Settlements occupy the 
same regulatory space as the Dodd-Frank Act, which is conventionally 
understood to represent an overhaul of the law of securitization.114  
However, Dodd-Frank does not preempt the regulatory standard laid down 
by the Securitization Settlements, because its rules are merely redundant 
with preexisting industry practice and also narrower than the theories of 
liability that animated the settlements.  For example, Section 941 of Dodd-
Frank provides “risk retention” rules, which require banks to hold a 
portion of the securities (roughly five percent) that are issued from their 
securitization.115  But risk retention was already standard prior to the 
financial crisis.116  In fact, all of the RMBS Working Group settlements 
involved banks that had retained greater than twenty percent of the risk 
from their securitization deals, which is more than four times the new 
“requirement” set out by Dodd-Frank.117 
Another relevant Dodd-Frank provision is Section 942(b), which sets 
out new disclosure rules that require banks to disclose information 
regarding the financial assets backing each class of securities that are 
issued as part of a securitization.118  As with risk retention, the sort of 
disclosures contemplated by Section 942(b) were already the industry 
norm.  Most securitizations were accompanied by a battery of offering 
documents—“term sheets,” “offering circulars,” “free writing 
prospectuses,” “prospectus supplements”—which contained hundreds of 
                                                          
 114.   See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, 101 CORNELL 
L. REV. ONLINE 115, 117 (2016), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2016/10/SchwarczOnline 
Essayfinal.pdf (stating that the “U.S. regulatory responses to securitization are primarily embodied in 
the Dodd-Frank Act”). 
 115.   15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012).  The rationale for Dodd-Frank’s risk retention rule is that, by 
forcing banks to retain a portion of the credit risk that is passed along to investors, they will be 
incentivized to do greater due diligence on the collateral backing the deal.  See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, 
supra note 94, at 1567–68. 
 116.   See Acharya, supra note 83, at 469 (“Financial institutions actually held on to large chunks 
of (mostly senior) tranches of their securitized assets.”); Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 94, at 
1547 (“The market-determined level of risk retention by securitizers during the recent boom was in 
fact too high, not too low.  The same Wall Street banks that led the league tables for the creation of 
MBS also bore much of the brunt of the losses when the underlying loans failed.”); Schwarcz, supra 
note 114, at 126 (“In my experience, the market itself has always mandated risk-retention.  Prior to 
the financial crisis, for example, originators and sponsors of securitizations usually retained risk on 
the financial assets, typically mortgage loans, included in those transactions.”) (footnote omitted). 
 117.   Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 94, at 1581, 1582 tbl. 1. 
 118.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
942(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(c) (2012)); see also § 945, 124 Stat. 
at 1898 (codified at § 77g(d) (2012))  (regarding disclosure of due diligence).  
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pages of statistics that described the securities being sold.119  The 
irrelevance of Section 942(b) is best illustrated by Goldman Sachs’ $550 
million ABACUS settlement.  There, the SEC focused on a failure to 
disclose “soft” circumstantial information regarding the role of certain 
parties involved in the deal, and did not allege any misrepresentations or 
omissions regarding the financial characteristics of the securities at 
issue.120  Thus, conduct that is prohibited under the new Dodd-Frank rules 
never actually took place during the financial crisis, while conduct that 
would be in perfect compliance with those rules resulted in across-the-
board regulatory settlements that imposed billions of dollars in penalties.  
The real overhaul of the regulatory framework for securitization was 
installed through the Securitization Settlements, rather than by Dodd-
Frank. 
3. The Benchmark Settlements 
An important part of the banking system involves the use of financial 
benchmarks, which are aggregation devices that reflect market-wide 
prices and are often incorporated into contractual terms.121  The most 
famous of these, Libor (the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate), is an index 
that is calculated based on banks’ estimates of their borrowing costs and 
then factored into the price of interest rate swaps.122  Because Libor 
represents the lowest interest rate that the market will bear at a given time, 
it is also widely relied upon as a baseline to price consumer debt—such as 
mortgages, credit cards, and student loans—and has therefore been called 
“the ‘world’s most important number.’”123  Benchmarks are also critical in 
                                                          
 119.   See Schwarcz, supra note 114, at 125 (“Prior to the financial crisis, the risks associated with 
complex securitization transactions and their underlying financial assets, including subprime mortgage 
loans, were fully disclosed . . . . The problem is that disclosure alone can be ineffective for highly 
complex securitization products.  For example, the task of deciphering a prospectus, hundreds of pages 
long and full of detailed technical and legal phraseology, is usually burdensome even for the most 
sophisticated institutional managers . . . .”); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1110, 1110 n.6 (2008) (“Most, if not all, of the 
risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for securities backed by subprime mortgages were 
disclosed, yet the disclosure was insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks very difficult 
to understand. The prospectus itself in a typical offering of these securities is, in my experience, 
hundreds of pages long.”). 
 120.   See Stephen M. Davidoff et al., The SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and 
Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP. L. 529, 540–42 (2012). 
 121.   See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 217 (2015). 
 122.  Melissa Anne Conrad-Alam, All Together Now: International Regulatory Response to the 
LIBOR Rate Setting Conspiracy, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 494–95 (2014). 
 123.   See id. at 492. (“Today, around the world, financial institutions, investment markets, 
mortgage companies, and private investment funds use LIBOR as the reference point for determining 
interest rates.”).   
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foreign exchange markets, where the W/M/Reuters index is a popular tool 
for pricing currency swaps and other financial contracts that are used in 
the five trillion dollar market associated with hedging exchange rate 
fluctuations.124  The regulation of benchmarks was fundamentally changed 
by two sweeping waves of settlements concerning allegations that various 
banks had been manipulating, or “rigging,” the calculation of Libor (the 
Libor Settlements) and the W/M/Reuters index (the ForEx Settlements) 
(together, the Benchmark Settlements). 
The path to the Libor Settlements began on May 29, 2008, when a 
Wall Street Journal article raised suspicions that the banks were 
manipulating the benchmark by reporting their borrowing costs in a 
strategic manner.125  That eventually lead to an investigation of Barclays 
by the CFTC, which ended with Barclays entering into three separate 
settlements on June 27, 2012—one with the CFTC ($200 million), another 
with the DOJ ($160 million), and a third with the UK Financial Services 
Authority ($92.8 million).126  The Barclays settlement involved three 
underlying allegations.  First, that Barclays swaps traders in New York 
had been communicating with the banks’ money market desk in London, 
and requesting that the London office alter its Libor submissions upwards 
or downwards, in order to push the benchmark in a direction that would 
favor Barclays in its trades with clients.127  Second, that separate requests 
to coordinate Libor submissions had been made between Barclays traders 
and traders at other banks, with the same aim of front-running clients.128  
And third, that high-level managers at Barclays had under-reported Libor 
submissions to regulators around the 2007–09 period—a time when every 
large financial institution was being scrutinized as potentially on the brink 
of collapse—in an attempt to make the bank’s financial position appear 
stronger.129  The Barclays settlement sparked a broader investigation, 
                                                          
 124.   See FIN. STABILITY BD., FOREIGN EXCHANGE BENCHMARKS: CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 
5–6 (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140715.pdf.  
 125.   Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, WALL ST. J. 
(May 29, 2008, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB121200703762027135.  Libor is 
“fixed” daily, based on voluntary submissions by a panel of approximately sixteen large banks, which 
provide estimates of the rate at which they anticipate being able borrow over variously time intervals 
(e.g. three months) and in different currencies.  It is calculated as the average of the reported rates after 
high-and-low outliers have been dropped.  See Conrad-Alam, supra note 122, at 494–96, 501. 
 126.  Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Barclays Settles Regulators’ Claims over Manipulation of Key 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/barclays-said-to-settle-
regulatory-claims-over-benchmark-manipulation/. 
 127.   In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC Lexis 39, at *5 (2012) (order instituting proceedings, 
making findings, and imposing remedial sanctions).  
 128.   Id. 
 129.   Id. at *9. 
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which quickly produced a series of agreements among the CFTC, DOJ, 
FDIC, UK authorities and other banks that had a role in setting in Libor.130  
Enforcement of the Libor manipulation scandal resulted in settlements 
totaling $9 billion.131 
An eerily similar chain of events was set in motion on June 12, 2013, 
when an international group of regulators opened wide-ranging 
investigations into the possible manipulation of the W/M/Reuters 
benchmark in foreign exchange markets.132  While ForEx benchmarks are 
aggregated based on actual trades, rather than submissions that estimate 
borrowing costs, those probes uncovered evidence that traders coordinated 
within and across firms—including in chat rooms with unhelpful names 
like “the cartel”—to strategically concentrate transactions in the trading 
window that was used to calculate W/M/Reuters, with the aim of biasing 
the benchmark in directions that were advantageous to the banks’ trading 
positions.133  A surge of regulatory settlements followed, which managed 
to exceed the Libor Settlements in scale.  On November 11, 2014, the 
CFTC announced nine-figure settlements with five banks and, on that 
same day, the OCC finalized three separate settlements of equal 
magnitude.134  On May 20, 2015, the DOJ settled criminal charges through 
agreements with five banks, one of which was joined by the New York 
Department of Financial Services (NY DFS), while the Federal Reserve 
Board announced civil settlements with the same group.135  Total penalties 
associated with the ForEx settlements equaled $10.3 billion. 
                                                          
 130.   UBS ($1.5 billion; Dec. 19, 2012); Royal Bank of Scotland ($612 million; Feb. 6, 2013); 
ICAP ($87 million; Sept. 25, 2013); Rabobank ($1 billion; Oct. 29, 2013); Deutsche Bank ($2.5 
billion; Apr. 23, 2015). Tracking the Libor Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Mar. 23, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/23/business/dealbook/db-libor-
timeline.html?mcubz=1#/#time370_10900. 
 131.   David Reid, This Scandal-hit Interest Rate Used to Set Mortgages Is To End in 2021, CNBC 
(July 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/27/scandalous-libor-rate-to-end-in-2021.html. 
 132.   See Phillipa Leighton-Jones & Stephen Grocer, How the FX Probe Unfolded, WALL ST. J.: 
MONEYBEAT (Nov. 12, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/12/how-the-fx-probe-
unfolded/. 
 133.   Id. 
 134.   The CFTC settled with: Citibank ($310 million); HSBC ($275 million); JP Morgan ($310 
million); RBS ($290 million); and UBS ($290 million).  The OCC settled with: Bank of America 
($250 million); JP Morgan ($350 million); and Citibank ($350 million).  See Matt Levine, Bank FX 
Fine Scorecard (Follow Along at Home!), BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-05-20/bank-fine-scorecard-follow-along-at-home-. 
 135.   The DOJ settled with: Citigroup ($925 million); JP Morgan ($550 million); Barclays ($710 
million; joined by the NY DFS for an additional $485 million); RBS ($395 million); and UBS ($203 
million).  The Federal Reserve Board settled with: Citigroup ($342 million); JP Morgan ($342 
million); Barclays ($342 million); RBS ($274 million); Bank of America ($205 million); and UBS 
($342 million).  Id. 
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The core features of the Benchmark Settlements closely paralleled 
aspects of the Securitization Settlements that allowed regulators to use 
those agreements to engage in de facto regulatory rulemaking.  Namely: 
(1) massive penalties that were applied on a comprehensive, industrywide 
scale; (2) the imposition of those penalties through enforcement actions 
that nearly all concluded with corporate settlements; and (3) the assertion 
of creative theories of liability that did not closely track any preexisting 
regulatory framework. 
The Benchmark Settlements signaled that the reliability of the Libor 
and ForEx indices was undermined by a widespread set of standard 
practices, rather than an outlier group of malfeasant firms.  Libor is 
calculated by a panel of sixteen banks, and almost every member of the 
panel became a party to regulatory settlements.136  Moreover, although the 
Barclays settlement publicized a collection of outrageous quotes from 
bankers who were brazenly trading rigged submissions in exchange for 
bottles of champagne and the like, it eventually became clear that such 
behavior was not particularly shocking to industry veterans, who assumed 
that the Libor numbers had been massaged at the margins for decades.137  
Likewise, ForEx markets are relatively concentrated, with about ten banks 
transacting in the trading window that is used to calculate W/M/Reuters 
and similar benchmarks.138  All or nearly all of those banks entered into 
nine-figure settlements with regulators.  And, in the ForEx context, the 
underlying conduct may also have been roughly in line with the 
expectations of market participants: funneling trades into the relevant 
window in which the benchmark is “fixed” is to a certain extent a required 
practice, albeit one that need not be performed in an aggressively 
opportunistic manner.139  Thus, as with the Securitization Settlements, 
liability was attached to the normal course of dealing of an entire industry. 
Once again, the dominant procedural vehicle for imposing liability 
was corporate settlement.  All $19.3 billion in penalties were extracted in 
connection with out-of-court settlements, which were negotiated without 
                                                          
 136.   EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42608, LIBOR: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 1 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42608.pdf (noting that the Libor panel was 
composed of 18 banks in 2012); see also BBA LIBOR Panels 2006, BRITISH BANKER’S ASS’N (June. 
23, 2006), http://www.bankfacts.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=145&a=7327 [https://web.archive. 
org/web/20061003072145/http://www.bankfacts.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=145&a=7327] 
(noting that the Libor panel was composed of 16 U.S. banks in 2006). 
 137.   See, e.g., Douglas Keenan, My Thwarted Attempt to Tell of LIBOR Shenanigans, FIN. TIMES 
(July 26, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/dc5f49c2-d67b-11e1-ba60-00144feabdc0; The LIBOR 
Scandal: Rotten Heart of Finance, THE ECONOMIST (July 7, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21558281. 
 138.   Verstein, supra note 121, at 237–38. 
 139.   See Levine, supra note 134.  
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a single defendants’ legal brief being filed in either administrative or 
federal court.  While certain of the DOJ’s ForEx settlements were 
nominally styled as “guilty pleas,” rather than deferred prosecution 
agreements, that label was misleading.  The admissions of guilt in those 
documents were immediately followed by waivers that negated any of the 
collateral consequences that are usually associated with guilty pleas—
namely, ineligibility for government contracting and collateral estoppel in 
follow-on civil suits—and were therefore treated by markets as 
indistinguishable from pretrial diversion agreements that contained no 
such admissions.140  And as with the financial crisis litigations, related 
actions against individuals were sparse, directed exclusively at low-level 
traders, and were rejected on the merits more often than not.141 
Most importantly, the Benchmark Settlements amounted to an implicit 
exercise in progressive regulatory rulemaking, rather than a crackdown on 
clear-cut violations of a well-established, preexisting legal prohibition.  As 
it turned out, there was essentially no formal “benchmark regulation”  in 
place at the time the manipulation allegations surfaced.142  The Libor 
system was managed by the British Bankers Association (BBA), a now-
infamous gentleman’s agreement governed by the very same panel of 
banks that made the submissions which were aggregated into the 
benchmark rate.143  The ForEx benchmark was similarly supervised by a 
light-touch association of industry members, known as the London 
Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee.144  The minimalist state of 
benchmark regulation is best illustrated by the fact that the BBA was the 
first to be informed of the allegations underlying the Barclays settlement, 
undertook a perfunctory investigation in 2008, and concluded within a 
matter of months that no major changes needed to be made to the 
system.145 
As a result of this regulatory void, the Benchmark Settlements invoked 
a bewildering mix of statutes and legal theories, none of which were 
                                                          
 140.   See Hugh Son & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Once-Unthinkable Criminal Pleas by U.S. Banks 
Get Investor ‘Meh’, BLOOMBERG (May 20, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
05-20/once-unthinkable-criminal-pleas-by-u-s-banks-get-investor-meh-. 
 141.   See Lindsay Fortado, Jury Acquits Five of Six Brokers in Libor Trial, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f5689ae2-c509-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e; see also Caroline 
Binham, Justice Department Weighs Charges Against London ForEx Traders, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 22, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/63caaa34-07db-11e6-a623-b84d06a39ec2. 
 142.   Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 201 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1930–34 (2017). 
 143.   See Conrad-Alam, supra note 122, at 498–500 (reviewing oversight of Libor by the BBA). 
 144.   Leighton-Jones & Grocer, supra note 132.  See also Conrad-Alam, supra note 122, at 498.  
 145.   See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reforming LIBOR: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 9 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 789, 798–99 (2013). 
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squarely applicable to the conduct at issue.146  For example, the OCC, 
FDIC, and Federal Reserve Board settlements all rely on a catchall 
provision from the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA), which prohibits 
practices that are inconsistent with maintaining the overall “safety and 
soundness” of a bank.147  Yet those settlements do not explain how the 
banks’ finances were rendered more fragile by the (profitable) 
manipulation of the Libor or ForEx benchmarks.148  Instead, they imply 
that the relevant unsafe practices involved the banks’ failure to detect their 
employees’ attempts to manipulate those financial benchmarks.  As a 
result, the findings of liability in those settlements are entirely derivative 
of an underlying theory of wrongdoing that is never articulated and 
presumed to have been established elsewhere. 
The antitrust violations asserted in the DOJ’s settlements are also 
awkward in the benchmark context.  For instance, the underlying 
allegations were that the banks had colluded to underestimate Libor in 
many cases, and thereby lowered prices for end-users of debt contracts as 
often as not.149  More importantly, antitrust claims by definition only apply 
to behavior that is coordinated among firms, and cannot reach attempts at 
benchmark manipulation—no matter how egregious—that take place 
within a single firm. 
The common denominator across the Benchmark Settlements were 
agreements involving the CFTC, which were premised on a dual violation 
of both the fraud and manipulation prohibitions contained in the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).150  It has been widely recognized by 
commentators, however, that each theory runs into fundamental 
conceptual and evidentiary problems.  The CFTC’s commodities 
manipulation claims are weak because, among other reasons, it is difficult 
                                                          
 146.   See Milson C. Yu, Note, Libor Integrity and Holistic Domestic Enforcement, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1271, 1276 (2013) (“The conclusion, then, is quite clear: contemporary statutory and 
regulatory regimes are inadequate to effectively capture reference rates and holistically enforce against 
their manipulation.”). 
 147.   Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 8(b)(1), 64 Stat. 873 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)(1), 1818(i) (2012)).  See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Case 
No. AA-EC-14-100 (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2014-
172.pdf (consent order for civil money penalty). 
 148.   JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., supra note 147, at 5 ¶ 14.  
 149.   See Sharon E. Foster, LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & 
COMM. L.J. 291, 318–19 (2013) (“If LIBOR has been manipulated down, at least since 2008, the theory 
goes that these debtors would benefit by the lower interest rates.”). 
 150.   See supra notes 127, 134, and accompanying text; see also Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. 
L. No. 74-675, §§ 6(c), 6(d), 9(a)(2), 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b, 13a-2 
(2012)). 
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to construe financial benchmarks as “commodities.”151  The fraud claims 
are undermined by the fact that manipulation of the ForEx benchmark 
involved strategically timed trades, not deceptive statements.152  Nor do 
Dodd-Frank’s amendments to the CEA’s fraud provisions—which move 
the relevant legal standard closer to the 10b-5 rule that prevails in 
securities law—completely close those gaps.153 
As should be clear, the precise admixture of legal theories that 
underpinned the Benchmark Settlements is somewhat beside the point.  By 
extracting penalties from every bank that had a significant role in Libor 
and ForEx swap markets, using whatever statute happened to be on hand, 
administrative agencies leveraged the settlement of enforcement actions to 
establish a new regulatory norm.  Roughly stated, the controlling rule is 
that liability for manipulation of a financial index will be forthcoming 
whenever data or trades are submitted in a strategic manner that 
undermines the overall integrity of the final benchmark rate.154 
In addition to that background standard, the Benchmark Settlements 
also incorporated terms that established new rules governing banks’ day-
to-day administration of the financial benchmarks.  This was 
accomplished through the CFTC-Barclays agreement, which set forth a 
roughly twenty-page template of detailed procedural reforms that was 
mechanically grafted onto subsequent Libor settlements.155  The 
                                                          
 151.   See Verstein, supra note 121, at 252 (“[The Commodities Exchange Act and other] anti-
manipulation probation statutes have not been operationalized in a manner that adequately discourages 
benchmark manipulation.”). 
 152.   It is also hard to establish the fraud element of reliance when the rigging at issue was an 
open secret among industry actors, who worked together to move benchmark prices.  See Yu, supra 
note 146, at 1277, 1291 (making these points); Fletcher, supra note 142, at 1936–37, 1936  n.34 
(same); Verstein, supra note 121, at 255–58 (same). 
 153.   Dodd-Frank amended Sections 4 and 6(c)(1) of the CEA, and the CFTC promulgated a pair 
of associated rules, known as Reg.180.1 and Reg. 180.2.  But see Verstein, supra note 121, at 254–55 
(Dodd-Frank amendments, even if retrospectively applied, would not have covered all of the conduct 
at issue in the Benchmark Settlements). 
 154.   Cf. Verstein, supra note 121, at 261–62. 
 155.   For example, the Barclays Settlement sets out specific factors that may be used in calculating 
Libor, how they are to be weighed relative to one another, and so on.  In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC 
Lexis 39, at *17–18 (2012); see Hester Peirce, Regulating Through the Backdoor at the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission 59–60 (Nov. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Peirce-Back-Door-CFTC.pdf.  Although such terms bear a 
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pretrial diversion agreements, they are in fact much more substantive in nature because the underlying 
content of benchmark regulation is procedural, and consists of the protocols that are used to aggregate 
those indices.  Compare In re Barclays PLC, supra, with Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief of 
Fraud Section of U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., to Gary R. Spratling and David P. Burns (Dec. 
18, 2012),  https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1114446/000119312513106100/d497201dex43. 
htm (setting out the standard NPA compliance terms).  See also Andrew Verstein & Gabriel V. 
Rauterberg, Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the 
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prescriptive quality of the Benchmark Settlements is most apparent in light 
of parallel reform efforts in the UK, where the leading policy document 
(known as the Wheatley Report) explicitly endorses the procedures 
outlined in the CFTC-Barclays settlement and adopts them as the defining 
guidelines for Libor submissions by UK banks going forward.156  Thus, in 
the case of the Benchmark Settlements, regulatory settlements have been 
used both to fashion a new regulatory prohibition, which covers a broad 
range of attempts at rate “manipulation,” and to lay down a standardized 
framework for how the calculation of certain indices is managed. 
C. Summary 
The three case studies presented above include some of the clearest 
and most impactful episodes of regulation by settlement.  But they 
nonetheless represent an illustrative rather than exhaustive set of 
examples.  Within the past decade, many other areas of banking regulation 
have been fundamentally altered by agencies engaging in settlement-only 
enforcement booms.  Four additional cases are worth noting in order to 
highlight the pervasive reach of regulation by settlement but will be 
surveyed in passing for purposes of space. 
One further example involves enforcement actions against banks that 
originated and serviced residential mortgages (the Mortgage Servicing 
Settlements).  From 2010 to 2012, the OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), entered into a 
sweeping series of settlements with banks relating to their foreclosure 
practices, which imposed a total of $25 billion in penalties.157  Like the 
Securitization Settlements, the Mortgage Servicing Settlements took a 
comprehensive “market share” theory of liability in order to reform the 
industry as a whole: the five largest settlements were with banks that had 
the five highest volumes of foreclosures.158  Another example is a 
                                                          
BBA, and the Future of Financial Reform, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 9, 35 (2013) (characterizing the invasive 
internal controls stipulated-to in the Barclay’s Libor settlement as “regulation by settlement”). 
 156.   See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT, 29 ¶ 4.9 
(2012) (“These [Libor] submission guidelines are closely modelled on the undertakings proposed by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in their settlement with Barclays Bank Plc.”). 
 157.   See generally Sally Scott & Jerry Anthony, National Mortgage Settlement 2–3 (Oct. 1, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ir.uiowa.edu/ppc_social_policy/6/. 
 158.   See id. at 3.  Like the CFTC’s agreements in the Benchmark Settlements, the OCC and 
Federal Reserve Board agreements contained vast remedial terms, which went beyond enhanced 
compliance procedures and dictated a new set of substantive industry standards governing foreclosures 
on mortgage loans.  See OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, FORECLOSURE-RELATED CONSENT 
ORDERS STATUS REPORT: OBSERVATIONS, PAYMENTS, AND FORECLOSURE PREVENTION ASSISTANCE 
(Apr. 2014). 
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collection of settlements that focused on the internal procedures that banks 
use to detect money laundering activities that take place through client 
accounts (the Anti-Money Laundering Settlements).159  A third case 
concerns settlements pursued by the DOJ and the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which invoke executive orders that place 
economic sanctions on certain foreign governments, and allege that banks 
failed to deter or detect financial transactions with those countries (the 
Foreign Sanctions Settlements).160  A final example is the Swiss Bank 
Settlements, in which the DOJ entered into seventy-eight NPAs with 
internationally-active financial institutions within a two-year span over the 
course of 2015 and 2016, all arising from claims that subsidiary banks 
located in Switzerland were used as tax havens that illegally sheltered the 
assets of U.S. citizens.161 
This section has walked through multiple series of settlements in a 
highly granular way, but that level of detail is necessary to move beyond 
truisms, such as the point that enforcement decisions can influence policy, 
or that out-of-court settlement agreements have become more common.  
The analysis thereby shows that recent enforcement episodes share a 
number of subtle features which, taken collectively, represent a regime 
change in financial regulation.  Time and again, regulatory settlements 
have been used on a systematic scale to indirectly promulgate novel legal 
standards and thereby reshape how the banking system operates along 
important dimensions.  In these areas, the legal center of gravity now 
consists of a body of settlement agreements, while traditional textual 
authorities (statutes, judicial opinions, regulatory rules, agency policy 
statements, the rulings of administrative courts, and so on) are limited to 
the periphery.  One consequence is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
post-crisis financial regulation is not wholly the domain of the Dodd-Frank 
                                                          
 159.   The list of agencies that took part in the Anti-Money Laundering Settlements includes the 
DOJ, the OCC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the “FinCEN” unit of the Treasury Department.  The 
underlying legal basis for corporate liability turned primarily on alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act.  See Sharon Brown-Hruska, Developments in Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laundering 
Enforcement and Litigation, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 5 (June 2016), 
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 160.   See Victoria Anglin, Note, Why Smart Sanctions Need a Smarter Enforcement Mechanism: 
Evaluating Recent Settlements Imposed on Sanction-Skirting Banks, 104 GEO. L. J. 693, 704–08 
(2016). 
 161.   See Garrett, supra note 41, at 38; Gibson Dunn Client Alert, supra note 37, at 4; Swiss Bank 
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program. 
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Act.  Instead, regulation by settlement has emerged as a parallel form of 
regulation that stands alongside that statutory framework. 
III. REGULATION BY SETTLEMENT & THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This Section explores the significance of regulation by settlement 
within the broader context of administrative law and argues that its unique 
procedural features represent a novel form of agency policymaking.  Part 
A outlines the legal balancing of discretion and constraint that 
characterizes the standard model of regulation in the administrative state.  
Part B demonstrates how regulation by settlement departs from those 
baseline principles, by comparing the recent use of regulatory settlements 
against more conventional modes of agency action.  In the process, the 
discussion that follows aims to shed light on the current divide between 
scholarship on financial regulation and administrative law, and takes some 
steps to bridge that gap. 
A. Background Principles of Regulatory Policymaking 
Administrative law scholarship circulates around certain points of 
consensus that can be understood to collectively reflect a standard model 
of how the modern regulatory state operates.  An initial premise is that 
administrative agencies are the predominant source of national public 
policy.  Although Congress is vested with legislative authority under 
Article I of the Constitution, it has nearly unlimited leeway to make a de 
facto delegation of that authority to the executive branch, so long as the 
statute that does so contains an “intelligible principle” that provides some 
minimal guidance as to what transfer has taken place.162  In practice such 
wholesale delegations are commonplace, and legislation frequently sets 
out only the barest outlines of political consensus.163  Administrative 
agencies, therefore, go much further than filling in the gaps left by 
ambiguous statutory language,164 and instead do the real work of 
policymaking that determines the substance of how the federal 
government actually governs.165 
                                                          
 162.   See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2011) (setting out the “intelligible 
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Concentrating policymaking discretion in the executive branch is 
considered a defensible institutional division of labor rather than an act of 
Congressional abdication.166  The justification is that agencies’ superior 
decision-making flexibility and technocratic expertise relative to Congress 
make them more adept at intervening in the complex problems that arise 
in an advanced capitalist society.167  A further point is that, in order to 
meaningfully exploit those advantages, agencies must necessarily exercise 
an overlapping combination of legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions in a way that may (superficially, at least) appear to be in tension 
with traditional separation of powers commitments.168  Although the 
pairing of expertise and discretion is desirable in the first instance, it 
nonetheless raises anxieties over agencies’ accountability, legitimacy, and 
reasoned decision-making.169  In order to assuage those concerns, agency 
discretion is hemmed-in by a byzantine patchwork of constraints—
imposed variously by Congress, the federal judiciary, and from within the 
executive branch hierarchy itself.170 
Policymaking by regulatory agencies is most often associated with a 
specific legal mechanism, notice-and-comment rulemaking, which is the 
closest administrative analogue to Congressional legislation.171  But there 
is no legal basis for prioritizing that particular procedure.  A foundational 
doctrine of administrative law, known as the Chenery principle, holds that 
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WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 124 
(2004) (regarding flexibility). 
 168.   See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers 
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 607–08 (2001).  See also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: 
FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 56–74 (2016) [hereinafter VERMUELE, LAW’S 
ABNEGATION]; LANDIS, supra note 167, at 46. 
 169.   See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003). 
 170.   Because the executive power that Article II purports to lay out is more or less missing, the 
history of administrative law is largely the story of how the varying sources and strengths of those 
constraints have been improvised over time.  See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (2012). 
 171.   See Stewart, supra note 10, at 444. 
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agencies have discretion to rely on whichever policymaking vehicle they 
prefer.172  That doctrine opens up a broad menu of procedural fora, which 
is jointly defined by the “organic” statute that Congress uses to delegate 
its authority to an agency, along with the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), which applies across statutes.  The full range of agency actions 
that follow can be reduced to three categories: rulemaking (with formal 
and informal variants); adjudication (also with formal and informal 
variants); and enforcement (through claims brought either in 
administrative or federal court). 
At first glance, the Chenery choice-of-forum principle threatens the 
equilibrium of discretion and constraint that underpins the standard model 
of agency decision-making.  That balance is nonetheless maintained, 
however, in light of two tradeoffs that tend to apply across the different 
forms of regulatory policymaking.  The first is a “formality-review” 
tradeoff.  When agencies elect to use relatively “formal” decision-making 
procedures to set policy—in other words, methods that impose a greater 
burden on the agency because they are more deliberative, participatory, or 
transparent to outside observers—those decisions receive less judicial 
scrutiny.  This tradeoff is explicitly introduced by judicial doctrines that 
determine which standards of review (for example, Chevron or Skidmore 
deference) apply to which agency actions.173  It also arises through a more 
subtle process, in which courts apply seemingly identical legal tests—such 
as the arbitrary-and-capricious standard—more or less stringently 
depending on the procedural context in which an agency has acted.174  The 
overall effect is that agency avoidance of ex ante (procedural) constraints 
is offset by greater ex post (judicial) constraints.175 
The second principle that applies across forms of administrative 
policymaking is a “substance-discretion” tradeoff, in which agency 
decisions that have a greater influence over substantive policy receive 
more scrutiny from other governmental actors.  Agencies can influence the 
substance of policy by either adopting statutory interpretations that are 
relatively bold compared to plausible textual alternatives, or by 
                                                          
 172.   SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 
289–90 (1974) (affirming Chenery II). 
 173.   See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 852 
(2001). 
 174.   Magill, supra note 16, at 1439–41; David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 
164–65 (2010).  
 175.   Cass Sunstein has labelled this tradeoff the “pay me now or pay me later” principle.  
Sunstein, supra note 16, at 225–26; see also VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra note 168, at 81; 
Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 331, 360–61 (2011).  
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intervening in issue areas that are of major significance to public policy.176  
When they do so, more intensive review will follow through one of two 
mechanisms.  First, there is the so-called “strategic substitution effect,” 
which means that when agencies undertake ambitious policy decisions 
they will preemptively adopt more formal procedures in order to survive 
subsequent levels of review.177  Second, a number of supplemental 
constraints—which may include judicial doctrines, executive branch 
protocols, or congressionally-mandated procedures—are triggered when 
agencies decide to aggressively push the direction of policy.  In short, the 
substance-discretion tradeoff means that when agencies make more 
vigorous use of policy delegations, that latitude is counterbalanced by 
additional ex post or ex ante constraints. 
To be sure, the one constant in administrative law is endless doctrinal 
caveats and a general over-complexity.  The two dynamics sketched 
above, therefore, represent systemic patterns rather than iron laws.  Yet 
they are sufficiently widespread that scholars have been motivated to 
search out genres of agency “unorthodoxy,” where the normal balance of 
legal constraint does not apply.178  The two most prominent cases, 
mentioned in the Introduction, are the regulation of emergencies and 
executive inaction.179  A good example of the latter is the Obama 
administration’s choice to refrain from applying portions of the federal 
drug laws that relate to marijuana.180  That decision evades the formality-
review tradeoff because it was promulgated through a handful of informal 
policy statements and DOJ memoranda, yet managed to sidestep judicial 
scrutiny under cover of the Heckler v. Chaney doctrine—which holds that 
the executive’s decision to not enforce the law cannot (in most cases) be 
reviewed by the courts.181  At the same time, the Obama administration’s 
decision also eludes the Substance-Discretion Tradeoff, since it 
fundamentally altered the substance of federal anti-drug policy without 
being subject to the checks that would have accompanied analogous 
alternatives, such as a massive revision to the federal sentencing guidelines 
governing the sale or possession of marijuana.182 
                                                          
 176.   Cf. Magill, supra note 16, at 1414 (“The greater the magnitude of the agency action, the 
more intense the judicial examination is likely to be.”). 
 177.   See Stephenson, supra note 17; Magill, supra note 16, at 1446–47. 
 178.   See supra notes 3–4. 
 179.   See supra notes 3–5. 
 180.   See generally Bradley E. Markano, Note, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana 
Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289 (2015). 
 181.   Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 182.   Markano, supra note 180, at 302–04. 
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With regulation by settlement, a new form of agency unorthodoxy has 
emerged.  Although this Article focuses on that development within the 
financial regulation context, the rise of regulatory settlements is significant 
for administrative law as a whole.  One reason is that—despite the habit 
of scholarship on the subject to draw its source material from agencies that 
are responsible for environmental, health, or safety regulation—there is a 
growing appreciation that financial regulation is the quintessential 
administrative law field.183  In addition, a recent influx of landmark 
agency-firm settlements in other areas, such as the automotive and 
pharmaceutical industries, suggests that regulation by settlement may be 
migrating to other portions of the administrative state as well.184 
B. Regulation by Settlement versus Standard Forms of Agency 
Policymaking 
The best way to understand the uniquely unconstrained quality of 
regulation by settlement is through a close comparison between that 
practice and the more conventional modes of regulatory policymaking: 
administrative rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement.  The discussion 
below undertakes that examination by touring a broad and somewhat 
technical range of administrative law doctrines.  A clear pattern emerges 
in the process.  While the dual tradeoffs of regulatory policymaking 
(formality-review and substance-discretion) consistently apply across the 
full menu of agency actions, they prove to be entirely inapplicable to 
regulation by settlement.  As a result, regulation by settlement slips free of 
the balance of constraint and discretion that is otherwise maintained for 
both formal and informal agency policymaking forms. 
1. Rulemaking 
The APA technically designates a particular “formal” rulemaking 
procedure, but it is almost never used.185  Instead, the most formal 
                                                          
 183.   See supra notes 20–21. 
 184.   Cf. William Yeatman, Executive Lawmaking in EPA-Justice Department-Volkswagen 
Settlement, NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 1, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/executive-lawmaking-in-epa-
justice-department-volkswagen-settlement-by-william-yeatman/ (discussing DOJ’s and EPA’s 
settlements with Volkswagen for violation of the Clean Air Act and false advertising); Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims 
Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
recovers-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2011 (detailing recent FCA settlements with 
pharmaceutical companies). 
 185.   5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (providing conditions that require formal rulemaking); see United 
States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (interpreting the APA triggers narrowly). 
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rulemaking that actually takes place is performed pursuant to the notice-
and-comment (n&c) procedures laid out in APA Section 553.  That 
provision requires agencies to undertake three steps when promulgating a 
regulatory rule: (1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register; (2) allow interested parties the opportunity to comment on the 
proposal; and (3) provide a response that considers the comments that have 
been made.186  In addition to the APA’s requirements, n&c rulemaking is 
further constrained by a review process that takes place within the 
executive branch—overseen by the President’s Office of Management 
Budget (OMB) and its subsidiary department, the Office of Information & 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—which requires that an agency submit a 
detailed cost-benefit analysis of its proposed rule for OIRA approval 
before that rule can be finalized.187  Regulations that are finalized through 
the n&c process are considered “legislative rules,” meaning that they carry 
the “force of law” in the same way that a Congressional statute does.188 
Agencies also have an inherent authority to engage in rulemaking 
outside of the n&c process, by issuing what Section 553 of the APA refers 
to as “interpretive rules” or “statements of policy.”189  Agencies frequently 
take advantage of this exception from the more formal n&c procedures to 
issue a wide array of documents, which are collectively known by 
shorthand as “guidance.”190  The regulatory standards set forth in agency 
guidance usually constitute “nonlegislative rules,” which lack the 
freestanding legal authority of n&c rules.191  The “nonlegislative” label 
captures the presumption that guidance documents concern comparatively 
                                                          
 186.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c). 
 187.   The OMB-OIRA review process was established by a series of executive orders that date 
back to the Reagan administration.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013).  The executive orders 
technically do not apply to independent agencies, but those agencies are informally pressured to 
comply.  Id. at 1839 n.3. 
 188.   Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2007) (“The 
legislative rule label is attractive in the sense that rules issued via notice and comment rulemaking 
often make new law or establish new policy that has the binding force of law.”).  For the notoriously 
complex scholarly debate over the precise contours of the “legislative rules” category, see generally 
David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE 
L.J. 276 (2010); Gerson, supra; John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893 
(2004). 
 189.   5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 190.   See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency 
Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007) (providing an overview of guidance); Robert A. 
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal 
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992) (same).  
 191.   Anthony, supra note 190, at 1315.  The practical consequence is that, when bringing an 
enforcement action in court, agencies may invoke violation of a legislative rule as the legal basis for 
taking action against a regulated party, but may not do the same for nonlegislative rules. 
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minor matters of procedure or interpretation, which are interstitial to the 
more robust legal mandates that are promulgated in statutory provisions or 
legislative rules. 
a. The Formality-Review Tradeoff 
The choice that agencies face when deciding whether to engage in n&c 
rulemaking or instead release guidance reflects the formality-review 
tradeoff.  The clearest example concerns the standard of review that 
applies to agency rules that resolve questions of law.  In its influential 
Mead opinion,192 the Supreme Court endorsed the (rough) rule of thumb 
that agencies’ statutory interpretations should receive Chevron deference 
in connection with judicial review of n&c rules,193 while review of agency 
guidance should be subject to the much more limited Skidmore standard 
of deference.194  The rule in Mead is subject to many caveats and 
complications, but the general thrust in this area of the law is that, for pure 
legal questions, judicial deference is positively correlated with 
administrative formality.195 
Another case where the tradeoff arises concerns judicial review of 
agency actions pursuant to the arbitrary-and-capriciousness (a&c) 
requirement found in Section 706(2)(A) of the APA.196  The classic 
explanation of a&c review, also known as the “hard look” doctrine, 
appears in the Court’s State Farm opinion, which states that an agency is 
required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’”197  Although in theory the same a&c 
                                                          
 192.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 193.   Id. at 219; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The 
precise meaning of Chevron deference has spawned endless debate, but the basic proposition is that 
courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation that any agency adopts with regard to ambiguous 
statutory language.  See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 
95 VA. L. REV. 597, 597 (2009). 
 194.   Mead, 533 U.S. at 220; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  When applying 
Skidmore deference, courts need only consult an agency’s interpretation to the extent that it is well-
reasoned or otherwise persuasive.  See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 211.  
 195.   See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (injecting some ambiguity into the Mead 
precedent); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (same).  See also generally Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 
1443 (2005) (examining the effects of Mead and its inconsistent application).   
 196.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 197.   Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see also Citizens to Pres. 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 
U.S. 99 (1977). 
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standard applies to all forms of agency rulemaking, the hard look doctrine 
indirectly favors legislative over nonlegislative rules.  That is because the 
quasi-procedural nature of the test articulated in State Farm—which 
demands that agencies “articulate a satisfactory explanation” for their 
decisions198—maps on to the elaborate reason-giving procedures that are 
already incorporated in n&c requirements. 
Regulatory settlements are less formal than the agency rulemaking 
process, no matter how it is conducted.  The clearest contrast is with n&c 
rulemaking.  Agencies regularly spend multiple years preparing a single 
n&c rule, during which time they produce thousands of pages of 
documentation that expose the underlying policy rationale to scrutiny from 
the public, Congress, the executive, and the courts.199  Settlements, on the 
other hand, are crafted through bilateral negotiations between agencies and 
firms.  The substance of those negotiations is kept confidential from the 
public, and they are conducted without being subject to any APA-
mandated procedures or systematic oversight by the OMB.200  Once deals 
are struck, they are memorialized by writings that take a variety of formats, 
but in many cases consist of a handful of pages that cover the barest of 
factual allegations and assert boilerplate legal conclusions.201 
Regulatory settlements are less formal than guidance documents as 
well.  For one, the APA calls for certain categories of guidance to be 
published in the Federal Register.202  It also includes a petition procedure 
that entitles stakeholders to request the “issuance, amendment, or repeal” 
of any guidance, and requires agencies to provide a reasoned written-
response.203  Perhaps most important is the relative levels of transparency.  
Guidance documents necessarily represent an official, explicit statement 
                                                          
 198.   State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  Thus, if an identical policy position is expressed in both an n&c 
rule and a guidance document, the former is less likely to be vacated on a&c grounds.  See Magill, 
supra note 16, at 1390–91. 
 199.   Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–88 (1992) (describing the increase in length of rules and explanations in 
preparation for judicial scrutiny); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254 (1987) 
(providing an influential theory of the ways that Congress uses administrative procedure to monitor 
the decision-making process of agencies).  
 200.   But see Farber & O’Connell, supra note 3, at 1162–63 (speculating that there may be OMB 
signoff on some settlements). 
 201.   See Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, supra note 54, at 527–28 (making 
this point with respect to NPAs and DPAs). 
 202.   5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012) (providing a “publication requirement,” which applies to agency 
guidance that takes the form of interpretive rules or policy statements). 
 203.   Id. at § 553(e); see Mendelson, supra note 190, at 440–41.  It is also common for agencies 
to voluntarily invite interest groups to consult on informal rules as they are being developed.  Id. at 
428. 
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of agency policy.  In contrast, the “rule” produced through regulation by 
settlement is implicit, and consists of the precedential signal that is 
cobbled together through a body of interrelated settlement agreements.  As 
a result, the policy that is embedded in regulatory settlements is less 
observable to third parties (and therefore less vulnerable to criticism).204 
Regulatory settlements are also subject to more limited judicial review 
than either legislative or nonlegislative rules.  The most extreme example 
is non-prosecution agreements (NPAs), which are concluded through 
agency “letters” that cannot be challenged in court on any grounds.205  
With deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), a charging document is 
filed in federal court but is accompanied by a settlement agreement, in 
which the DOJ commits—subject to the court’s approval—to withhold 
trial on the pending charges and to dismiss them completely after a 
specified period if the defendant corporation complies with certain 
conditions.206  Judicial approval of DPAs is generally a mechanical, 
automatic process.207  In 2015, when a DPA was rejected by a federal judge 
for the first time ever, the D.C. Circuit unanimously reversed, explaining 
that courts have no authority to second-guess the substantive merits of 
DPAs in any respect, and may only intervene to deter prosecutorial 
harassment of defendants.208 
The same general exclusion of meaningful substantive or procedural 
review also applies to regulatory settlements based on civil claims, which 
are typically styled as consent orders and filed simultaneously with a civil 
complaint before a federal court or administrative tribunal.209  As with 
DPAs, the applicable standard of review for civil regulatory settlements 
was also recently highlighted by an emphatic appellate reprimand—in this 
instance a unanimous Second Circuit reversal of Judge Rakoff’s decision 
to withhold approval of one of the Securitization Settlements, between the 
                                                          
 204.   Some suggestive evidence on this point is the DOJ and SEC’s apparent reluctance to issue 
comprehensive guidance on their FCPA enforcement practices, despite being subject to years of 
questioning over the policy decisions reflected in corporate anti-corruption settlements.  See Koehler, 
Grading the FCPA Guidance, supra note 81, at 1–2. 
 205.   See Garrett, supra note 9, at 924. 
 206.   Id. at 922–24. 
 207.   See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS 
USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 
25 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf (finding that “judges reported they were 
generally not involved in the DPA process”). 
 208.   United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’g United States 
v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160 (D.D.C. 2015); cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 
No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *4–8 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013).  
 209.   See Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 743–44 (scope of review is equivalent for consent orders and 
DPAs). 
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SEC and Citigroup.210  There, the Second Circuit made clear that civil 
settlements, including those that seek to further “the public interest” 
through various forms of injunctive relief, can only be rejected by courts 
in the event that they fail to meet basic procedural thresholds for legality, 
intelligibility, or prosecutorial misconduct.211  In sum, for all forms of 
regulatory settlements, regardless of their particular procedural posture, 
the scope of judicial review is sharply circumscribed relative to any of the 
standards that are applicable in the rulemaking context. 
The formality-review tradeoff holds across different forms of 
rulemaking.  When regulation by settlement is considered alongside n&c 
rulemaking and agency guidance, however, it turns out to be both the least 
formal and least reviewable of all three agency actions.  That leads to some 
curious outcomes in the financial regulation context, where Dodd-Frank 
has made n&c rulemaking the predominant policymaking tool.212  For one, 
the disparate levels of formality effect the timing of regulation.  The SEC 
concluded its earliest Securitization Settlements before Dodd-Frank was 
even passed in 2010.  Meanwhile, six years later, more than one-fifth of 
the rulemakings that the SEC is required to issue under Dodd-Frank have 
yet to be finalized.213  Such divergent timelines would make sense if the 
more deliberative approach taken with rulemaking yielded less ex post 
scrutiny.  Instead, the opposite has occurred.  An important SEC rule was 
struck down by the D.C. Circuit in its Business Roundtable decision, and 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has vacated one of the 
CFTC’s rules as well.214  By contrast, the Securitization Settlements have 
been granted perfunctory judicial approval in all but one instance, the 
                                                          
 210.   SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d. Cir. 2014), vacating and 
remanding SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 211.   Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 295–97; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 
1460–62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the “public interest” criterion does not open up room for 
substantive judicial review). 
 212.   See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Fourth Quarter 2014, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP 
2 (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.davispolk.com/files/Q4_2014_Dodd-Frank_Progress_Report.PDF 
(finding that Dodd-Frank mandates that regulatory agencies promulgate roughly 395 new 
administrative rules). 
 213.   See Ian Cuillerier & Elizabeth A. Martinez, Implementing Dodd-Frank: Current Status of 
SEC Mandatory Rulemaking, WHITE & CASE (Sep. 23, 2016), https://www.whitecase.com/ 
publications/article/implementing-dodd-frank-current-status-sec-mandatory-rulemaking. 
 214.   Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down SEC proxy 
access rule as arbitrary and capricious); Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, 887 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (striking down a CFTC rule setting position 
limits on derivatives tied to 28 physical commodities), appeal dismissed, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22618 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 2013); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and 
the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 704–05 (2013) (analyzing the broader 
trend of recent “repeated invalidations of SEC rulemakings”). 
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Citigroup case, which was quickly reversed upon appeal.215  With 
regulation by settlement, the formality-review tradeoff is turned upside 
down. 
b. The Substance-Discretion Tradeoff 
When agencies undertake rulemaking they are subject to the 
substance-discretion tradeoff through a number of mechanisms.  One of 
the most direct devices is the Supreme Court’s “major questions” doctrine, 
recently applied in its review of the Affordable Care Act, which stands for 
the principle that agency statutory interpretations will not receive Chevron 
deference if they resolve questions of great national importance.216  As 
agencies raise the policy stakes, courts tighten ex post constraints to 
compensate.  Another relevant tool involves statutory provisions that 
direct agencies to address certain legal issues through n&c rulemaking, 
and often further require that those rules be finalized by pre-specified 
deadlines.  That tactic, which Congress used to an unprecedented extent in 
Dodd-Frank217, shuts the door on the opportunity for agencies to rely on 
guidance to resolve policy decisions that are considered sensitive by 
Congress. 
A more subtle source of the substance-discretion tradeoff arises from 
the strategic substitution effect: when developing relatively significant or 
innovative regulatory policies, agencies have an incentive to voluntarily 
shift from guidance to rulemaking in order to safeguard those decisions 
with more deferential judicial review.218  Less risk-averse agencies, on the 
other hand, may adopt the opposite strategy, and attempt to rely on 
guidance as a way to smuggle significant policy decisions under the n&c 
radar.219  One roadblock that the latter strategy will run into, however, is 
                                                          
 215.   See Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 289.  
 216.   King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. 
EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444–46 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
132–33, 159–61 (2000); cf. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 193 (discussing the “major questions” 
doctrine). 
 217.   Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 724–25 (2013) (“Statutory deadlines are scattered throughout administrative 
law, but the scope and scale of their use in Dodd-Frank is unheard of.”). 
 218.   Stephenson, supra note 17, at 530–31.  Empirical studies find that guidance documents 
usually tackle smaller issues, which suggests that the strategic substitution effect is a pervasive 
influence.  Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance 
Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 821–22 (2010). 
 219.   See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1755, 1776–77 (2013); Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What 
Agencies Can (and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2011). 
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put in place by executive orders that mandate OIRA review for any agency 
action that produces a “significant” rule, regardless of whether a rule is 
nominally packaged as guidance.220  A further hurdle is introduced by 
“procedural review” of guidance, a judicial doctrine that empowers courts 
to invalidate any agency rule that purports to be nonlegislative guidance 
but in substance resembles the broad policy positions that are 
characteristic of legislative rules.221  Taken together, this pair of executive 
and judicial safeguards limits an agency’s chances of skirting the 
substance-discretion tradeoff through the opportunistic use of guidance. 
The substance-discretion tradeoff thus permeates the incentives that 
agencies face when deciding whether to shift between rulemaking forms.  
Regulation by settlement, by contrast, avoids those same dilemmas in 
dramatic fashion.  As each of the three case studies show, regulatory 
settlements have been used to establish de facto legal standards that are 
bolder than what is provided by related statutory or administrative rules: 
the FCPA Settlements stake out more extreme policy positions than those 
that are found in the FCPA Guidance, the Securitization Settlements 
reflect a theory of liability that goes far beyond Dodd-Frank’s disclosure 
and due diligence reforms in the same area, and the Benchmark 
Settlements impose a broader prohibition on financial market 
manipulation than was provided in parallel CFTC regulations, both before 
and after Dodd-Frank.222  At the same time, relative to regulatory 
settlements, agency rulemaking is subject to more intensive oversight on 
all fronts—from Congress, the courts, the Executive Office of the 
President, and the public. 
A hypothetical comparison between agency guidance and regulatory 
settlements drives this point home.  Assume that the implicit rule created 
by the Securitization Settlements was instead formulated as a guidance 
document—call it, the “Securitization Interpretive Rule.”  Pursuant to the 
APA, the relevant legal standard would be articulated in express terms 
(e.g. “banks shall be liable for negligent securitization practices”), 
                                                          
 220.   A rule will be categorized as “significant” if it estimated to have an “annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more” or if it “raise[s] novel legal or policy issues.” Exec. Order No. 
12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), supplemented by Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 
3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007), revoked by Exec. 
Order 13497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009); OMB Memorandum M-09-13 on Guidance for 
Regulatory Review (Mar. 4, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/ 
assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf. 
 221.   The logic is that, once guidance is unmasked as a de facto legislative rule, it automatically 
follows that it is procedurally defective for failing to comply with the n&c process.  See Seidenfeld, 
supra note 175; David L. Franklin, Two Cheers for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 111, 120–21 (2012); see, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 
1020–21 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945–48 (D.C. Cir. 1987).   
 222.   See supra Section II.B. 
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published in the Federal Register, and subject to public petition requests 
thereafter.  The Securitization Interpretive Rule would easily qualify as a 
“significant” rule—$50 billion in settlement penalties satisfies the 
applicable $100 million annual impact requirement for 500 consecutive 
years—and therefore fall under the executive branch requirements for 
formal cost-benefit analysis and OIRA review.  If it satisfied the OIRA 
process, the Securitization Interpretive Rule might then face a “procedural 
review” challenge in federal court, and potentially be vacated on the 
grounds that it is a defective nonlegislative rule.  If the Securitization 
Interpretive Rule survived procedural review, and was eventually put at 
issue in a subsequent enforcement action against a regulated party, it 
would then undergo a second round of judicial scrutiny, pursuant to the 
a&c hard look doctrine as well as the minimally deferential Skidmore 
standard.223 
There is a strain of administrative law scholarship that regards 
guidance with suspicion, and the business law literature is even quicker to 
condemn “regulation by guidance” as an unacceptably informal way to 
make policy “through the back door.”224  But everything is relative.  
Compared to regulation by settlement, guidance is a staple of the agency 
policymaking toolkit, is predictably conservative in scope, and is 
constrained by an array of well-established procedural safeguards. 
2. Adjudication 
Agencies act in an adjudicative capacity when issuing orders that 
resolve legal questions concerning particularized parties.225  Under the 
Chenery principle, agencies are free to use those same decision-making 
procedures to announce new policies of general applicability.226  Prior to 
the ascendance of n&c rulemaking, the historical norm was for agencies 
to develop regulatory rules through adjudicative proceedings, and a few 
agencies continue to maintain that practice.227 
                                                          
 223.   The latter inquiry in particular would be a hard sell, given the government’s lack of success 
in analogous financial crisis litigations.  See supra Section II.B.ii. 
 224.   Peirce, supra note 155, at 22–24 (criticizing CFTC guidance as backdoor policymaking); 
but cf. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: 
Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 966–95 (1998) (explaining 
how certain expressions of SEC policy, known as no-action letters, can slip through the procedural 
cracks that normally govern interpretive statements and other guidance documents). 
 225.   See 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012); see also David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or 
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1965). 
 226.   SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208 (1947) (Chenery II); see Shapiro, supra note 225, 
at 925–27. 
 227.   See Daniel R. Ernst, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES 
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Administrative adjudications are conducted with varying degrees of 
formality.  The APA requires that agencies are required to adopt “formal” 
adjudicative procedures whenever the applicable organic statute calls for 
a hearing “on the record.”228  Formal adjudications include oral argument 
before an independent Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), along with many 
of the procedural amenities that are attendant to litigation in federal 
court.229  Where an organic statute does not contain the relevant triggering 
language, the APA allows agencies to engage in “informal” 
adjudication.230  Agencies are free to conduct informal adjudications 
through as minimal a process as they deem reasonable,231 but in practice 
those proceedings tend to incorporate some form of paper hearing and are 
resolved by the decision of a neutral Administrative Judge (AJ) (a variant 
on the ALJ position).232 
a. The Formality-Review Tradeoff 
Judicial doctrines that govern the formality-review tradeoff in the 
rulemaking context apply to an agency’s choice of formal versus informal 
adjudications.  For questions of law, the Mead rule controls and calls for 
federal courts to apply Chevron deference to agency statutory 
interpretations announced in formal adjudications while applying the 
stricter Skidmore standard in informal adjudications.233  “Hard look” a&c 
review also applies to all forms of agency adjudication.  As in the case of 
rulemaking, the a&c standard provides an implicit gradient of deference 
between formal and informal adjudications due to the more thoroughgoing 
deliberation that is built into the formal hearing process.  The same may 
                                                          
IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014) (tracing formative efforts to constrain the policymaking capacity of 
agency adjudications).  Contemporary adjudication-centric agencies include the National Labor 
Relations Board, the Bureau of Immigration Affairs, and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Federal Trade 
Commission.  See, e.g., Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in 
Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 274 (1991).   
 228.   5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012). 
 229.   Id. at §§ 554, 556–58 (providing procedural requirements for formal adjudications).  One 
major departure from federal trial practice is that hearsay and other exclusionary rules in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not apply in agency adjudications.  See generally William H. Kuehnle, Standards 
of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 829 (2005). 
 230.   5 U.S.C. § 555.  
 231.   Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990); see also Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 232.   See Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 
757–79 (1976).  The putative “independence” of ALJs and AJs might seem to limit the policymaking 
potential of administrative adjudications, but it does not do so in practice because senior agency 
officials have effectively unlimited discretion to revise the legal conclusions and findings of fact that 
are contained in an initial adjudicative decision.  5 U.S.C. § 557(b). 
 233.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–35 (2001). 
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also be said of judicial review of agencies’ findings of fact, where a 
nominally distinct pair of standards—”substantial evidence” in formal 
proceedings; arbitrary-and-capricious review for informal adjudications—
are widely recognized as indistinguishable in practice.234  Because the 
structure of formal adjudications will generate more comprehensive 
evidentiary records than is the case for informal adjudications, applying a 
common evidentiary threshold to both procedures leaves the latter on a 
more secure footing. 
Regulatory settlements entail less legal formality than either variety of 
adjudication.  On one level the distinction holds almost as a matter of 
definition: even the most barebones informal adjudication concludes with 
a legal determination on the merits, while settlements are quasi-contractual 
negotiations that result in agreements-not-to-agree.  The contrast becomes 
more concrete with respect to formal adjudications.  There, ALJs oversee 
elaborate adversarial procedures that resemble a full civil trial, and justify 
the agency’s disposition of the case with detailed opinions that are 
comparable in sophistication to those issued by federal circuit court 
judges.235  A final distinction turns on the publicness of agency 
adjudication.  While settlements are purely bilateral, judicial doctrines 
have grafted broad intervenor rules onto the APA’s requirements for 
formal adjudications, which facilitates direct stakeholder participation in 
those proceedings.236 
The scope of judicial review for regulatory settlements is also 
narrower than any standard that is applicable to formal or informal agency 
adjudications, including the substantial evidence test.237  The doctrinal 
differences are not just semantic and can be seen in outcomes.  Empirical 
studies indicate that findings of fact in administrative adjudications are 
regularly overturned by federal courts.238  So too are adjudicative 
                                                          
 234.   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (providing the statutory basis for the substantial evidence standard); 
see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 478–79 (1951) (explaining substantial evidence); 
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the two standards are functionally identical). 
 235.   See note 229 and accompanying text.  According to one study, the average opinion of SEC 
ALJs contains a comprehensive recitation of the relevant factual findings, legal analysis and choice of 
remedy, and is similar in length and complexity to securities law opinions issued in the Second Circuit.  
See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1180 (2016). 
 236.   See Magill,supra note 16, at 1398–99, 1433. 
 237.   As the Second Circuit held in reversing Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the Citigroup settlement, 
the legal standard for court approval of an agency settlements does not require those agreements to 
meet any level of factual sufficiency.  See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 297–
98 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 238.   See Zaring, supra note 174, at 141 (finding that “appellate courts reverse agency formal 
adjudications of fact slightly more than one third of the time”). 
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determinations of law, with a notable recent example being the D.C. 
Circuit’s reversal of a significant adjudicative order issued by Dodd-
Frank’s Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.239  Thus, administrative 
adjudication reflects another area of agency policymaking where the 
formality-review tradeoff holds across both formal and informal 
procedures but does not reach regulation by settlement, which combines 
minimal formality with minimal review. 
b. The Substance-Discretion Tradeoff 
The most critical decision affecting the mode in which regulatory 
policy is produced is an agency’s choice between rulemaking and 
adjudication.  With the “rulemaking revolution” that took place in the 
1960s and 70s, that decision came to reflect the substance-discretion 
tradeoff operating on an historical scale.  During those decades, a 
confluence of legal and non-legal changes caused agencies to shift to 
rulemaking as the dominant forum for issuing high-impact policy 
decisions.240  But as substantive policymaking migrated toward 
rulemaking, the courts improvised a set of constraints to follow.241  The 
result is that, since administrative rules became the engine of executive 
policymaking, the n&c process has been “ossified” by the imposition of 
multi-year procedural hurdles, and the overall equilibrium of agency 
discretion and constraint remains in place.242 
The substance-discretion tradeoff can also be seen at work along a 
number of dimensions with respect to agencies’ use of formal versus 
informal adjudication.  First, as a result of the strategic substitution effect, 
agencies frequently layer procedural formalities onto informal 
adjudications, although the APA does not require them to do so.243  
Second, the Supreme Court’s caselaw on constitutional due process 
includes doctrines that require agencies to provide enhanced procedural 
protections in adjudications where a significant deprivation of liberty or 
                                                          
 239.   PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated by PPH 
Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (awaiting decision).  
 240.   See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American 
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–60 (1996); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: 
Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1143–1155 
(2001); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375–76 (1974). 
 241.   In particular, a&c review was re-conceptualized with the hard look doctrine and the APA’s 
n&c provisions were interpreted in a way that gave those requirements surprising teeth.  See 
VERMUELE, LAW’S ABNEGATION, supra note 168, at 33. 
 242.   See McGarity, supra note 199. 
 243.   See Verkuil, supra note 232, at 739–42. 
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denial of access to important public goods is at stake.244  Third, Section 
554 of the APA enables Congress to tailor the formality of adjudicative 
procedures to the significance of a given policy area, by triggering a 
requirement for formal adjudication whenever a statute supplies the 
relevant hearing “on the record” language.245 
With regulation by settlement, agencies have been systematically 
adopting bolder, more substantive policy positions in regulatory 
settlements than in adjudications.  The case studies reflect a pattern that 
provides strong evidence on this point.  In each case, agencies have largely 
hesitated to bring claims against individuals (in federal or administrative 
court) in connection with the same allegations that underpin million or 
billion dollar settlements with their employer firms; and in the rare 
instances when the agencies’ legal theories do reach adjudication, they are 
quite often rejected on the merits.246  Therefore, relative to agency 
adjudication, regulation by settlement evades the substance-discretion 
tradeoff—with less formality, less judicial review, and more progressive 
policymaking. 
The preceding analysis is particularly relevant to financial regulation, 
where administrative adjudication is making a comeback.  Under Dodd-
Frank, administrative courts receive expanded subject matter jurisdiction 
and remedial authority for certain securities law claims, and the SEC has 
taken advantage of those reforms by relying more heavily on formal 
adjudications conducted in-house by its ALJs.247  In doing so, the agency 
has sparked a firestorm of controversy in the business law press and 
scholarship, where SEC adjudications are characterized as dangerously 
illegitimate substitutes for litigation in federal court.248  These criticisms 
                                                          
 244.   See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970).  The constitutional due process case law can therefore be seen as an analogue to the “major 
questions” doctrine applied to rulemaking, but with administrative procedure serving as the 
supplementary constraint rather than heightened judicial review. 
 245.   5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012); cf. Gersen, supra note 217, at 692 (explaining how Congress now 
drafts statutes to obtain the same control in the rulemaking context). 
 246.   See supra Section II.B. 
 247.   See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–1, 78u–2, 78u–3) 
(expanding adjudicatory jurisdiction over certain securities fraud claims, including insider trading, and 
increasing limits on the SEC’s civil fining penalties).  
 248.   See, e.g., David Bario, As the SEC Brings More Administrative Proceedings, Criticism 
Grows, AM. LAW. (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202718494167/As-the-
SEC-Brings-More-Administrative-Proceedings-Criticism-Grows; Giles D. Beal IV, Judge, Jury, and 
Executioner: SEC Administrative Law Judges Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 416–
17 (2016); Gretchen Morgenson, Crying Foul on Plans to Expand the S.E.C.’s In-House Court System, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/business/secs-in-house-justice-
raises-questions.html. 
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reflect a serious confusion over administrative law, as there is nothing 
irregular or unconstitutional about Dodd-Frank’s marginal extension of 
adjudicative authority for financial regulators.249  The controversy itself is 
instructive, however.  As with anxieties about “regulation by guidance,” 
the outcry over SEC adjudication provides another case where an 
administrative mechanism is perceived to be regulatory discretion run 
wild, when in fact it fits comfortably within a well-defined network of 
constraints. 
3. Enforcement 
The APA bifurcates the administrative process into either rulemaking 
or adjudication, and does not recognize “enforcement” as an equivalent 
form of agency action.  Agencies nonetheless perform an enforcement 
function, which has distinct legal and conceptual features, and regulatory 
policy can be influenced by decisions regarding how that function is 
exercised.250  Regulatory settlements are a normal part of the 
administrative enforcement process but, as will be explained, regulation 
by settlement as a policymaking technique departs from conventional 
agency enforcement practices in significant ways. 
An agency’s ability to initiate enforcement proceedings is determined 
by its organic statute, which may authorize actions in administrative court, 
federal court, or both.  Where an agency is not entitled to bring a civil 
enforcement action directly, it can usually refer cases to the DOJ, which 
may litigate on the agency’s behalf.251  The internal deliberative process 
that an agency uses to determine whether to bring an enforcement action 
is not structured by any APA requirements and, under the Heckler 
prosecutorial discretion doctrine, those decisions are not reviewable in 
                                                          
 249.   Agency adjudication is the most historically-entrenched regulatory practice in American 
government.  SEC ALJs render decisions pursuant to elaborate, congressionally-mandated procedures 
that have been in place unchanged since 1946, and all findings of fact and law in those decisions are 
reviewable in federal court.  See Zaring, supra note 235, at 1197 (making the same general point); but 
see Gideon Mark, Response: SEC Enforcement Discretion, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 261 (2016) 
(providing a contrary view).  Although constitutional challenges to SEC ALJs have very recently 
yielded a circuit split, neither of those cases stand for the proposition that the Dodd-Frank Act 
represents an impermissible extension of the SEC’s adjudicative authority.  Compare Raymond J. 
Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting all constitutional challenges), reh’g 
granted, 2017 WL 2727019 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2017) (awaiting decision), with Bandimere v. SEC, 
844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that the SEC’s procedures for selecting ALJs violates the 
Appointments Clause). 
 250.   See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1042–45 
(2013). 
 251.   See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on 
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345–46 (2000). 
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court outside of a few exceptional circumstances.252  Once an affirmative 
decision to enforce has been made, the primary procedural requirement is 
the “separation of personnel” rule provided in APA Section 554(d), which 
prohibits certain agency officials from simultaneously prosecuting an 
enforcement action and adjudicating its merits.253 
Administrative law scholarship often fails to examine the agency 
enforcement function in isolation; instead, it tends to collapse enforcement 
into the adjudication side of the rulemaking versus adjudication 
paradigm.254  For purposes of understanding the constraints on 
administrative policymaking, that analytical move makes good sense 
under most circumstances.  When narrowly construed, “enforcement” 
represents an intermediate procedural step—the decision to request that 
another governmental actor, a federal or administrative judge, consider 
taking some proposed action.  It is therefore not a self-sufficient platform, 
like rulemaking or adjudication, from which an agency can make binding 
legal determinations or declare policy positions.  From this perspective, 
there is little need to consider the policymaking dynamics of enforcement 
because enforcement occupies a pre-policymaking phase in the 
administrative process.  And, once an administrative enforcement 
proceeding has commenced, the familiar constraints applicable to agency 
adjudication come into play. 
Enforcement also does not pose problems for the standard model of 
administrative policymaking when it is considered directly.  Traditional 
administrative enforcement is entirely consistent, for example, with the 
substance-discretion tradeoff.  On one hand, the enforcement decision 
involves less procedural formality or judicial review than rulemaking or 
adjudication.  It therefore represents agency discretion at its high point.  
On the other hand, an enforcement decision is at best a form of agenda 
control,255 whereby agency personnel can “suggest” that an ALJ or federal 
judge adopt a new policy direction.  That is a non-negligible source of 
influence, but much less impactful than what can be accomplished through 
n&c rulemaking or formal adjudication.  Thus, enforcement pairs maximal 
discretion with minimal substance, and the standard equilibrium holds.256 
                                                          
 252.   Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985). 
 253.   5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012).  There are exceptions for higher-level agency decision-makers.  
 254.   See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 
827–28 (2015) (“[T]here are few (or no) satisfying definitions of agency enforcement that are cleanly 
divisible from adjudication.”); see also Magill, supra note 168. 
 255.   See generally Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and 
Bureaucratic Politics, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 379 (1986). 
 256.   The substance-discretion tradeoff may also apply at the decisional level internal to 
enforcement: namely, whether to bring an enforcement action before an ALJ or in federal court.  The 
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Despite enforcement’s unassuming role within the broader menu of 
agency policymaking forms, “regulation by enforcement” is a prominent 
concept in the securities law scholarship, where the SEC’s influence over 
the law of insider trading is considered a paradigm case of the practice.257  
Analyses of regulation by enforcement often paint a picture of imbalanced 
policymaking due to prosecutorial discretion run amok.258  A review of the 
development of insider trading, however, indicates that regulation by 
enforcement is yet another area where consternation over allegedly 
deficient administrative procedure is largely misplaced. 
The origins of modern insider trading law can be traced to a 1961 
adjudicative decision by the SEC, Cady Roberts, which put a creative spin 
on the leading regulation governing securities fraud known as Rule 10b-
5.259  The particular trading prohibition announced in Cady was officially 
embraced by the courts in the Second Circuit’s Texas Gulf Sulphur 
decision of 1968.260  When the SEC and DOJ began to pursue more 
expansive enforcement theories in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court 
reversed those actions with a pair of landmark decisions, Dirks and 
Chiarella, which comprehensively re-wrote the legal framework for 
trading liability.261  Since then, insider trading law has evolved pursuant to 
an expansive body of federal common law which has micromanaged the 
                                                          
SEC claims that it takes big, policy-relevant cases to federal court, rather than to ALJs, on the grounds 
that federal trials provide more procedural formality.  Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum 
Selection in Contested Actions, SEC (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-
approach-forum-selection-contested-actions.pdf. 
 257.   See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 15, at 155; see also ANTHONY BARKOW & RACHEL BARKOW, 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 
(2011); ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982); James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of 
Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 635 (2007). 
 258.   A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 55, 60 (2016); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality 
Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999, 1024–25 (2012). 
 259.   In re Cady, Roberts & Co., No. 8-3925, 1961 WL 59902 (Nov. 8, 1961); Rules and 
Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2015); cf. SEC 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (affirming SEC policymaking 
through adjudication, per the Chenery principle). 
 260.   SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 261.   Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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applicable legal standards,262 the occasional Congressional intervention,263 
and SEC rulemakings that are reactive to movements in the case law.264 
The record reflects that the SEC’s enforcement priorities have played 
a role in insider trading law, but not a role with greater influence than other 
regulatory tools, and certainly not a role which exceeds that of the courts.  
The ironic takeaway is that insider trading turns out to be a textbook 
example of the constrained and multi-faceted nature of administrative 
lawmaking, rather than a case of single-minded prosecutorial discretion 
gone wild.265  Although a comprehensive review of other areas where 
agency enforcement strategies play a prominent role in policy 
development—for example, in antitrust regulation or other parts of 
securities law—is beyond the scope of this article, the basic lesson 
provided by insider trading generally holds in those instances as well.266  
Thus, even during purported episodes of regulation by enforcement, the 
agency enforcement function represents a relatively conventional form of 
administrative policymaking. 
There are two exceptional cases, however, where enforcement shifts 
from an orthodox to an unorthodox mode of agency action.  One is the 
                                                          
 262.   See Pritchard, supra note 258, at 60 (“[T]he Court has not been satisfied to simply decide 
the [insider trading] case before it . . . [and has] ranged widely in defining the law of insider trading.”); 
Heminway, supra note 258, at 1006–08 (calling the applicable materiality test a “judicially constructed 
definition”).  For the most recent examples, see generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 
(2016); United States. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive Primer (2001) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261277 (reviewing the evolution of insider 
trading case law). 
 263.   See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 
102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t–1, 78u–1, 80b–4a (2012)); Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 
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law insider trading prohibition by enacting legislation in 1984 and 1988 ramping up the penalties for 
insider trading.”). 
 264.   The SEC finalized Rule 14e–3 in response to Chiarella and Dirks.  Rules and Regulations 
Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e–3 (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) 
(2012).  The SEC’s most significant recent policymaking on insider trading consist of a disclosure rule 
known as “Reg. FD.”  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–03 (2015). 
 265.   See Magill, supra note 16, at 1402 n.62 (making this same point). 
 266.   In the antitrust context, see William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial 
Discretion, and the ‘Common Law’ Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 686–87 (1982).  
Another notable episode of enforcement by the SEC took place in the early 2000s, when the agency 
worked in conjunction with efforts by Eliot Spitzer (then New York’s Attorney General) to bring 
prosecutions against the mutual fund industry.  See BARKOW & BARKOW, supra note 257.  The SEC 
quickly retreated from the more aggressive tactics of that campaign, however, and a combination of 
regulatory rulemaking, guidance, and judicial review soon occupied the same policy space.  See Park, 
supra note 22, at 154–55; Jonathan R. Macey, State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 117, 133 (2004) (arguing that Spitzer’s interventions in securities markets represented a 
“hostile takeover of the SEC,” “hijacking its agenda”). 
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familiar practice of non-enforcement through agency inaction.267  Non-
enforcement is able to upset the substance-discretion tradeoff that 
typically applies to agency enforcement by taking advantage of the agenda 
control aspect of the enforcement procedure with a highly aggressive 
strategy of “negative agenda control.”268  By systematically excluding 
critical portions of the regulatory framework from the adjudicative phase 
where enforcement is given final effect, preexisting policy positions can 
be negated in a way that amounts to a new round of significant substantive 
policymaking.  Since non-enforcement on such a scale is a fairly extreme 
measure, the most notable cases of agency inaction are usually the product 
of presidential high politics, as the marijuana example from the Obama 
administration suggests.269 
Regulation by settlement represents a second strategy for destabilizing 
the standard substance-discretion balance of agency enforcement.  With 
traditional agency enforcement, there may often be high settlement rates 
of 80 or 90 percent without the settlement process having any real impact 
on policy.  The majority of cases which settle involve cookie-cutter issues 
that do not raise significant legal questions, and for the minority of 
enforcement actions that are premised on novel theories, defendants have 
an incentive to see the dispute through to adjudication on the merits.  At 
that point, agency adjudication becomes the relevant policymaking forum, 
and the decision to announce progressive policies is up to the ALJ (or 
federal court judge).  This is how insider trading law was launched, by an 
SEC adjudication that produced the Cady decision.270 
Regulation by settlement only becomes possible in the post-2000s 
enforcement landscape, where a number of factors converge to make the 
settlement of corporate enforcement actions a foregone conclusion.271  As 
a result, enforcement is no longer an intermediate step that allows policies 
to be proposed to adjudicators.  Instead, policymaking decisions occur 
directly in the enforcement phase, where actions that assert novel legal 
theories are associated with significant negotiated penalties as a matter of 
course.  Under the conditions just described, settlement may still remain a 
low-stakes, idiosyncratic process that does not function as a significant 
                                                          
 267.   See supra note 4.  
 268.   See GARY W. COX & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE 
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2005) (analyzing the negative 
agenda control concept in the Congressional context). 
 269.   See Markano, supra note 180, at 291.  But cf. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) 
(affirming by an equally divided court the Fifth Circuit’s decision that rejected Obama 
administration’s non-enforcement of immigration laws). 
 270.   See Cady, Roberts & Co., No. 8-3925, 1961 WL 59902 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
 271.   See supra Section II.A. 
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policymaking vehicle.  But regulation by settlement has emerged in recent 
years because, as the case studies provided above illustrate, agencies have 
decided to leverage the new dynamics of settlement to the greatest extent 
possible.272  In the process, federal agencies have managed to reshape the 
nature of financial regulation and administrative policymaking. 
IV. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Section turns to the normative and prescriptive issues that are 
raised by the positive analysis of regulatory settlements presented above.  
Part A evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of regulation by settlement 
as a regulatory tool.  Part B reviews the policy debate around regulatory 
settlements and suggests some limited reforms. 
A. Evaluating Regulation by Settlement 
A threshold point when considering the merits of regulation by 
settlement is that there is nothing inherently problematic about the 
settlement of legal disputes relative to their resolution on the merits 
through adjudication.  That is not necessarily the consensus view, and 
there is a long tradition of modest hostility toward settlement in the 
scholarship.  The classic critique by Owen Fiss focused on the fact that 
settlement denied plaintiffs an opportunity to fully assert their legal rights 
and foreclosed public articulation of important social values by courts.273  
More recently, anti-settlement sentiment has been revived and directed at 
regulatory settlements with a forceful twist.  The main concern, voiced 
most prominently by Judge Rakoff, is that regulatory settlements typical 
take a “neither-admit-nor-deny” format, which allows defendants to avoid 
being associated with any official statement of wrongdoing, as would 
otherwise be forthcoming with a trial verdict or criminal guilty plea.274  
                                                          
 272.   One simple way to appreciate the impact of regulation by settlement is to compare the role 
of enforcement in the formation of insider trading law and anti-corruption law under the FCPA.  In 
the former case, the SEC and DOJ’s enforcement strategies exerted a substantial but far from dominant 
influence.  In the FCPA context, those agencies’ enforcement decisions have produced a body of 
settlements that swallow up the policy space completely. 
 273.   Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984).  For a more recent 
version, see Dana. A. Remus & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Corporate Settlement Mill, 101 VA. L. 
REV. 129, 132 (2015). 
 274.   Rakoff, supra note 28; see Urska Velikonja, Securities Settlements in the Shadows, 126 
YALE L.J.F. 124, 129 (2016); Priyah Kaul, Note, Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s 
“Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny” Policy, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 535, 537 (2015); Ross MacDonald, 
Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforcement Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
419, 419–20 (2012).  
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While the prior critique emphasized judicial affirmance of positive rights, 
the contemporary argument recasts the point in more punitive terms, and 
calls for the public acknowledgement of legal culpability. 
The classic rebuttal, equally applicable to both critiques, is that the 
institution of settlement redeems individuals’ private right to be free from 
legal conflict, and promotes the public interest by ensuring efficient 
administration of the courts (in the context of civil litigation) and by 
economizing on the scarce enforcement resources of the government (in 
the context of regulatory actions).275  There is also a further weakness 
specific to Judge Rakoff’s line of argument.  Any push for admissions of 
guilt is self-defeating in the current regulatory environment because a 
defining feature of regulation by settlement is that agencies seek to hold 
firms liable on an across-the-board, industrywide basis.  By definition, 
such blanket assertions of wrongdoing carry no stigma, no reputational 
harm, and no negative signal to the market.276  This point was made clear 
by the Benchmark Settlements when guilty pleas were awkwardly 
shoehorned into certain settlements and investors did not bat an eye.277  
With regulation by settlement, “a fine is a price”—no matter how it is 
labelled.278  Admissions of wrongdoing will only carry the force that their 
proponents desire in a much more minimalist, selective enforcement 
regime. 
A second variety of objections centers on the claim that regulatory 
settlements are contrary to “rule of law” principles, in various ways.279  
One basic vulnerability of this position is that there is no obvious 
consensus over what precise, concrete requirements the rule of law 
entails.280  Like “justice,” the “rule of law” label is more of a conclusion 
than a description and can often stand for nothing more than the mix of 
                                                          
 275.   See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009) (providing a defense of settlements).   
 276.   See JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS 
BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 235–36 (2013). 
 277.   See Son & Dexheimer, supra note 140. 
 278.   Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (2000); cf. Daniel 
R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321 (1996). 
 279.   Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed Through 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 191 (2016). 
 280.   See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (“Significantly, however, the meaning of the phrase ‘the Rule of Law’ . . . 
has always been contested.”).  Debates relating to the rule of law reflect a dilemma that applies to most 
cases of radical theoretical disagreement, such as those found in moral philosophy: consensus over 
specific cases cannot be generalized to broader conceptual categories, while agreement on abstract 
concepts only takes place at a level of specificity that is insufficient to apply them to particular cases.  
See also BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 147–48 (1985). 
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legal-political norms that are preferred or simply familiar to the user.  That 
practice is especially problematic in the regulatory settlement context 
because settled principles of administrative law are often met with extreme 
skepticism, and perfectly mundane practices—agency adjudication, 
guidance through non-legislative rules, enforcement of insider trading—
are considered exercises in lawlessness.281  The general posture of these 
arguments can be understood as an accidental alliance between a majority 
of the business law literature on the one hand and an embattled minority 
of public law scholars on the other, the latter of which deny the legitimacy 
of the post-New Deal regulatory state as a whole.282 
Although there is a more charitable reading of the rule of law critique, 
it runs into even deeper problems.  This Article claims that there is an 
identifiable collection of legal principles that works to constrain most 
forms of administrative policymaking, but does not apply to regulation by 
settlement.  A plausible implication is that regulatory settlements now 
present a rare, genuine threat to rule of law values.  The issue is that 
adopting such a view does not end the analysis, because the rule of law is 
just one good that must be traded off against others.283  A wholesale 
rejection of regulation by settlement is only justified if there are no related 
benefits that offset the costs of administrative unorthodoxy. 
In practice, regulation by settlement involves a number of costs and 
benefits.  One obvious benefit is policy flexibility.  Regulation must keep 
pace with rapidly changing economic conditions, which result not only 
from technological progress but also from the process of regulatory 
                                                          
 281.   A common thread in these critiques is the need for government to maintain a separation of 
powers structure—but the combination of government functions within the executive branch is a 
premise of the administrative process.  See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 49–52 (1975); see also 
Magill, supra note 168. 
 282.   See generally, PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014) 
(condemning the administrative state in general); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION (2014) (same); Lawson, supra note 165. 
 283.   For example, the regulation of emergencies often requires neglect of standard legal 
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what happened during the financial crisis with “regulation by deal.”  See Davidoff & Zaring, supra 
note 6, at 464–65; cf. Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 675 (2015) 
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RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 6, 10, 432, 434 (1978) (presenting a similar argument in which rights are 
“trumps”).  The American legal system does not tend to adopt the position of Rawls and Dworkin, and 
allows tradeoffs between rights against other values in most contexts, including Fifth Amendment due 
process rights.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–34 (1976) (laying out a balancing 
test for procedural due process). 
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arbitrage, in which firms find innovative ways to avoid compliance with 
the current regulatory environment.284  Both of these dynamics are at a 
high point in the financial sector, which is especially adaptive compared 
to other industries.285  Regulation by settlement is uniquely well-suited for 
these problems, as settlements can be put in place much more quickly than 
Congressional legislation or agency regulations made through the 
rulemaking process. 
Another advantage of regulation by settlement is that, due to the lack 
of constraints from other governmental actors, it is a relatively powerful 
way to leverage agency expertise.  With regulatory settlements, agencies 
can stretch statutory language liberally and are, therefore, not closely 
bound to Congressional policy judgments.  The limited availability of 
judicial review preserves agency policy decisions against second-guessing 
by the courts.  The confidentiality of settlement negotiations also 
forecloses significant public scrutiny and popular pressure.286  These 
features appear questionable at first glance, but become assets when 
effective policy turns on highly technical issues rather than broad value 
judgments.  The historical independence of the Federal Reserve to control 
monetary policy is perhaps the ultimate example of technocratic 
autonomy, and the justifications for that arrangement hold true across 
finance more generally. 
Against the benefits of flexibility and expertise, regulation by 
settlement also presents certain costs.  One potential cost arises from the 
fact that regulatory settlements, even when used in systematic fashion, 
tend to signal legal standards that have limited specificity.  The vagueness 
of regulation by settlement means that it may leave regulated industries 
uncertain as to what constitutes legal compliance, and thereby deter 
otherwise desirable economic activity.  At the same time, this point should 
not be overstated.  The rules versus standards literature does not present 
strong across-the-board conclusions regarding the optimal predictability 
or specificity of legal rules, and regulations that retain a degree of 
ambiguity are likely preferable in certain areas, including financial 
fraud.287  In addition, the case studies indicate that agencies are sometimes 
                                                          
 284.   For a more general argument regarding the “social acceleration of time” phenomenon in 
advanced capitalist democracies, see SCHEUERMAN, supra note 167. 
 285.   See Merrill, supra note 2, at 190 (noting “quicksilver” aspect of the financial industry); 
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 286.   Stewart, supra note 1, at 1687. 
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Ambiguity in Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 233–34 (2014); cf. Louis Kaplow, 
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2017 REGULATION BY SETTLEMENT 319 
able to wring a surprising amount of precision out of settlements: a 
hospital administrator in Tajikistan is most likely a “foreign official” for 
purposes of the FCPA. 
A greater concern than the verbal specificity of a legal standard is 
whether the underlying policy it applies is misguided.  Regulation by 
settlement has two features that may bias the policies it produces in a 
systematic manner.  One is the problems raised by multiple enforcers.  
Particularly in finance, it is increasingly common for several agencies to 
enter into regulatory settlements with respect to a single firm and course 
of conduct.  That raises the complicated problem of inter-agency 
coordination.288  Even if it is possible for a single agency to identify a 
socially optimal settlement structure, multi-agency enforcement 
introduces the subsequent hurdle of aggregation across enforcement 
actions. 
A second source of policy bias relevant to regulation by settlement 
comes from what are known as public choice or political economy 
problems—the presence of incentives that reward government actors for 
departures from impartial, public-regarding decision-making.289  Political 
economy problems are likely to be acute in the context of regulatory 
settlements, where skyrocketing corporate penalties present opportunities 
for “for-profit public enforcement” and a general pull towards over-
deterrence.290  Public choice dynamics appear at multiple levels of the 
executive hierarchy.  First, there is a revolving door for individual 
regulators, who can obtain career rewards by maximizing enforcement 
penalties—gaining a reputation for achieving large fines enhances a 
regulator’s exit opportunities by signaling professional aptitude while also 
growing the market for compliance services.291  Second, at the agency 
                                                          
 288.   See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
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 289.   See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003), 
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853, 853–57 (2014); see Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign 
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 291.   Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2015).  As one 
example of this dynamic: on the same day that the New York’s Department of Financial Services 
announced a multi-million-dollar ForEx settlement with Barclays, its commissioner announced that 
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level, there is the classic model of bureaucratic aggrandizement: the larger 
the bureaucracy the more powerful the bureaucrat.  There is some evidence 
of this model at work in recent regulatory settlements, where agencies 
inflate annual enforcement statistics and advertise themselves as “profit 
centers” of the federal government as part of Congressional or executive 
budget requests.292  Lastly, there are public choice problems at the higher 
levels of the political process that are especially relevant for financial 
regulation.  A common theme at the intersection of political and financial 
history is that when governments seek out vehicles for wealth 
redistribution, the banking system often presents a tempting (but 
ultimately costly) substitute for the tax system.293 
The preceding discussion has focused on isolating the key concepts 
and factors that are necessary to consider in evaluating regulation by 
settlement.  It is likely impossible to weigh them collectively in a way that 
supports a categorical conclusion about the desirability of recent 
settlement practices one way or the other. The most plausible 
interpretation is that regulatory settlements can be a quite effective 
regulatory tool in some contexts but perform poorly in others.  It also 
implies that policy reforms should be incremental, searching for ways to 
improve the cost-benefit profile of regulatory settlements at the margin. 
B. Reforming Regulation by Settlement 
The rise of regulatory settlements has attracted substantial attention 
and inspired suggestions for a wide variety of policy responses.  Although 
an exhaustive analysis of each proposal is beyond the scope of this Article, 
the overview that follows identifies the general strengths and weaknesses 
of existing ideas and recommends some further directions for reform. 
A common theme of most commentary is the need to facilitate greater 
scrutiny of the settlement process.  The preferred mechanism to do so 
varies, but some popular options can be canvassed briefly.  The most 
straightforward proposal is for federal judges to unilaterally assert more 
stringent standards of judicial review for settlements, as exemplified by 
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Judge Rakoff’s Citigroup decision.294  An alternative approach would rely 
on Congressional intervention, through legislation that expressly provides 
an enhanced judicial review mechanism.295  Another legislative remedy 
already proceeding through Congress is the “Truth in Settlements Act,” 
which requires greater public disclosure of the terms in regulatory 
settlements.296  Other proposals turn to the agencies themselves.  One 
influential idea is for the DOJ to adopt guidelines that standardize the 
negotiating process for PDAs.297  The scholarship has also recommended 
that agencies make the settlement process more transparent and 
participatory by conducting public hearings prior to finalizing terms.298 
The proposals outlined above each raise particularized difficulties, but 
in the context of regulation by settlement they share one common 
conceptual shortcoming: they are all premised on oversight mechanisms 
that would examine individual settlements in isolation.  There is a quality 
control orientation to these approaches which assumes that the relevant 
policy problem is to encourage best practices through procedures that deter 
or otherwise weed out ill-advised settlement terms (or entire agreements).  
That assumption may be unproblematic in a traditional criminal law 
context, where outlier conduct by a limited group of rogue prosecutors is 
a major source of policy dysfunction, but it fits poorly with the current 
corporate enforcement environment, where settlements tend towards 
boilerplate and uniformity has, if anything, gone to extremes. 
A good example is the Swiss Bank Settlements, which involved the 
DOJ concluding over 70 PDAs within a two-year period.  The terms in 
those agreements do not vary widely, or at all.  The urgent question raised 
by that episode is not whether “PDA #47” has flouted a guideline or can 
survive the rigors of a public hearing or pass the eye test of a randomly 
assigned federal judge.  Rather, what is at stake is whether the entire, 
programmatic imposition of liability has a sound policy rationale when 
considered as a whole: what its implications are for the structure of the 
international banking system; whether it will have a positive or negative 
impact on systemic financial risks; how other financial institutions around 
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the world will interpret its significance as regulatory precedent, and what 
actions they may take in response; the reaction in various international 
markets; and so on.  The underlying point is that the conventional logic of 
dispute resolution does not apply to regulation by settlement which verges 
on macroeconomic policy in its scale.  Therefore, reforms that would 
supply a useful source of procedural regularity in prior eras will not 
address contemporary regulatory dilemmas. 
A distinct reform strategy that has been put forward seeks to assess 
regulatory settlements at a more aggregate level.  The ideas in this area 
build off of the “presidential administration”299 motif that originated in the 
rulemaking context and look for ways to develop more sophisticated 
procedures for centralized oversight of administrative enforcement (and 
adjudication) practices within the executive branch.300  The Obama 
administration already took a significant first step in this direction by 
issuing its “Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance” in 2011.301  That 
document directs agencies to compile enforcement data in a transparent 
and accessible format so that comparisons can more easily be made across 
agencies.  The overall goal is information-sharing as a means to facilitate 
inter-agency coordination.  The presidential administration proposals aim 
to deepen that general strategy, primarily by institutionalizing the 
enforcement oversight function within the OMB, as part of OIRA or with 
a new equivalent body.302 
Enhancing the executive branch infrastructure to allow for holistic 
oversight of administrative enforcement is the most promising measure 
that has been advocated for managing the future development of 
regulatory settlements.  It addresses the one of the core challenges posed 
by regulation by settlement—the need for inter-agency coordination—and 
reflects a response to the increasingly interrelated structure of regulatory 
settlements.  In addition to the steps detailed in existing proposals, two 
further procedures could be adopted that would complement the broader 
undertaking of executive review. 
First, because large regulatory settlements are so concentrated in the 
financial sector, information should be aggregated that specifically 
analyzes agreements in that policy area.  Once compiled, that data could 
then serve as the basis for an impact report or equivalent analysis, prepared 
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by the Office of Financial Research (OFR) for the Financial Services 
Oversight Committee (FSOC).303  The purpose of the report would be to 
evaluate how recent enforcement activity interacts with other aspects of 
the regulatory framework under Dodd-Frank, and the extent to which it 
raises issues relating to the broader stability and efficiency of the financial 
sector. 
Second, the individual agencies responsible for financial regulation 
should modify their current practices regarding the reporting of 
enforcement activity.  The annual enforcement summaries of agencies 
such as the SEC and CFTC currently read like giddy recaps of a highly 
successful fundraising drive.304  The most appropriate interpretation of 
regulation by settlement, however, is that enforcement essentially 
functions as an implicit rulemaking process and serves as a boundary 
marker for sound industry practices.  In other words, enforcement is now 
predominantly a regulatory device, not a backstop against outlawry.  There 
should therefore be some annual accounting of enforcement activity by 
financial agencies that treats aggregate dollar penalties collected as a 
policy variable to be optimized in light of related factors, rather than a 
metric of success.305 
To summarize, the current regulatory enforcement environment is 
complex and not amenable to grand over-arching reforms.  At the same 
time, two high level principles should guide policy adjustments in this 
area.  First, reform must shift from procedures that seek to manicure 
settlements at an individual level to procedures that seek to take a more 
systemic view that focus on broader patterns of enforcement. Second, as 
part of the process of developing centralized executive branch oversight 
of enforcement patterns, there is value-added in concentrating those efforts 
on agencies responsible for financial regulation and facilitating an active 
role in that process by entities that Dodd-Frank has established for 
systemic monitoring of the financial sector. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article examines the evolution of enforcement settlements 
between federal regulators and firms.  It argues that the increased scale 
and innovative legal form that those practices have taken amounts to a 
novel regime of regulation by settlement, with significant implications for 
scholarship on both financial regulation and administrative law.  The legal 
framework that has been developed to govern the post-crisis financial 
system is not just a product of Dodd-Frank as is conventionally assumed.  
Instead, rules established under that regulatory infrastructure sit alongside 
a substantial body of implicit legal standards that have been promulgated 
through the precedential signal set by regulatory settlements, which 
agencies have used in a systematic fashion to target certain areas of the 
financial sector.  A new genre of administrative policymaking has emerged 
in the process.  By removing nearly all the legal constraints familiar to 
conventional forms of agency action, regulation by settlement has an 
unruliness reminiscent of administration during periods of emergency, and 
other unorthodox styles of executive policymaking.  Financial regulation 
is an historical and institutional centerpiece of administrative law, yet 
existing legal scholarship largely fails to explore the intersection of those 
two fields.  The broader contribution of this Article is to bridge that gap in 
the literature by analyzing the business law and public law aspects of the 
regulatory process in conjunction. 
 
